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The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two 
branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts 
to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using “the power of the purse” to either 
appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. 
 The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain 
variables, including public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the relative majority of the party 
that holds power in one or both chambers, and the ways these variables may impact the behavior 
of the legislative branch in this regard.   
It also includes the analysis of appropriations requests made by the legislative branch for 
funding military engagement in rejection of requests from the executive branch for all military 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the core issues that the framers of the United States Constitution faced at the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was the issue of separation of powers in the 
federal government.  Following a six-year period of governing under the Articles of 
Confederation, which produced a weak central government and glaring inadequacies that 
threatened the sanctity of the newly formed union, the delegates to the Convention designed a 
new document with the intent of strengthening the federal government, but defining the roles of 
the branches of this government and providing a separation of powers that would prevent one 
branch from becoming more powerful than the others. 
The first two articles of the Constitution define the roles of the legislative and executive 
branches, respectively, detailing the powers of and restraints on each, including identifying 
which branch has the ability to produce revenue bills (legislative) and to command the armed 
forces and militias (executive).
1
  The definitions provided were sufficient in regard to the 
imminent needs of the emerging republic and helped to provide a stable basis for a stronger 
central government, but left much up for interpretation as the responsibilities of the government 
grew with time.     
One area that was left ill-defined was the power to create and enact the nation‟s foreign 
policy.  Does the executive branch alone have the ability to determine how this policy is crafted 
and when military force can be used?  Or does the legislative branch, through the power of the 
purse, have the ability to determine when and how this power should be used?  If the legislative 
                                                 
1
 “The Constitution of the United States,” Articles 1-2. 
 
 2 
branch inherently has this power, has it been usurped by the executive branch through precedent 
brought about by presidents who have sought to expand the power of the presidency?  Or has it 
been voluntarily abdicated by a legislative branch placated with the responsibility of oversight 
and the ability to bring about reactionary reform, rather than pro-active policy creation?   
Beyond the general questions about the defined power of each branch, the issue becomes 
more complex during instances of divided government, when the executive and legislative 
branches are controlled by different political parties. What political factors play into the role the 
legislative branch plays in the crafting of foreign policy during those instances?  Do variables, 
including public opinion, budgetary constraints, or the relative size of the majority in the 
legislative branch, impact the role this branch plays?  Or is this often subservient role dictated 
purely by precedent and tradition? 
With the role of the legislative and executive branches in the creation and enactment of 
foreign policy at the height of political discussion today, it is both timely and historically 
relevant to analyze this rivalry.  The question of the constitutionality of President Barack 
Obama‟s decision to prosecute Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya in March 2011, without 
seeking a declaration of war from the Congress or consulting with congressional leadership in 
any way, has come from the leadership of both the Democrat majority in the Senate and the 
Republican majority in the House and has reopened the debate amongst pundits and academics 
about the relationship between these two branches of government.
2
 
The best way to understand this relationship and the way in which each branch extends 
its reach into the foreign policy arena is to analyze the fundamental cog in the foreign policy 
                                                 
2
 Williams, Pete and Jonathan Hutcheson.  “Did Obama violate the Constitution with Libya military action?”   
MSNBC.  22 March 2011.  Web.  22 March 2011. 
 3 
engine: appropriation of funds for military campaigns.  Analyzing the types of appropriations 
requests passed by Congress relative to military campaigns during periods of divided 
government since World War II will shed light on whether the Congress attempts to exert its 
influence on foreign policy.   
It is my prediction, prior to the completion of any research on this question, that the 
legislative branch, which will be referred to going forward as LB, will attempt to assert its 
authority to impact the prosecution of foreign policy during such periods in our government, but 
will do so unsuccessfully.  As co-equal branches of government, the LB, when compelled by a 
division in political ideology with the Executive Branch, which will be referred to going forward 
as EB, will attempt to reject the wishes of the EB through the power of the purse, but will find 
such attempts difficult at best.  After spending two years serving as a legislative aide for a 
Member of Congress during a period of divided government, I have personally experienced this 
relationship between the two branches and believe a complete analysis of the variables at play 
will prove this correct.  
 
Origins of the Struggle 
 
As a largely isolationist nation for at least the first century of its existence, the United 
States had a relatively insignificant role on the world stage until World War I, and the extent of 
its affairs with nations outside of the Western Hemisphere involved trade and commerce until 
that point in history.  The Monroe Doctrine established this trend, and for a nation more 
concerned with manifest destiny on its own continent, holding itself together through a Civil 
 4 
War, and growing its economy during the Industrial Revolution, foreign affairs with nations 
across either the Atlantic or Pacific oceans took a backseat until the 20
th
 Century.   
The world changed significantly with the First World War, however, and with this 
change emerged the presence of the United States as a world power.  It was no longer enough to 
worry about what happened on its own soil, and since that war, the United States has been a 
major player in every significant war and military conflict between nations, particularly in 
Europe and in the Middle East.  This role in the affairs of other nations thrust the prominence of 
the American Presidency into the forefront of world politics.  Often called the “leader of the free 
world,” the American President is the face of American foreign policy and democracy as an 
ideology. 
The essence of democracy, however, is the ability of the people to determine their leaders 
and to have a say in the choices made by their government.  While the American President is 
elected by the people, it is an indirect election through the Electoral College, and as a singular 
office has the least direct responsibility to the electorate of any elected official in the federal 
government.  On the other hand, Members of Congress, particularly in the House of 
Representatives, are directly elected by a small, specific constituency to whom they are directly 
responsible. 
These contrasts in responsibility to the electorate between the two branches in this 
context create the following questions: what is the role of the LB in foreign affairs?  Do the 
elected officials most directly responsible to the electorate have a role in how this policy is 
crafted?  Does the indirect election of the EB through the Electoral College protect the EB from 
public opinion and their responsibility to the electorate when they make decisions unilaterally?  
 5 
Do the people held responsible for allotting funds for military engagement have a say in the 
policies and programs that spend the money they allot?         
These questions may have been asked for many years, but have been no more relevant 
than over the past decade, during which time America has been engaged in military action in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, faces an imminent threat from Iran, and must defend its borders from terrorist 
threats.  These questions are also made relevant by the four most recent political showdowns 
during periods of divided government.  The Congress elected in 1994, a new Republican 
majority opposing a Democratic President, passed restrictions on foreign aid that impacted 
President Clinton‟s ability to pursue enlargement and achieve many of his foreign policy goals in 
the post-Cold War era.  The Congress elected in 2006, led by a new Democratic majority seeking 
a change of direction in foreign policy while a Republican President resided in the White House, 
created a political showdown that helped to define both the progress of America‟s military 
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan and played a significant role in public perception of the 
candidates in the 2008 presidential election.  More recently, the Congress elected in 2010, led by 
a new Republican majority in the House of Representatives, is seeking to bring about a new era 
of fiscal restraint in direct opposition to the policies of a Democratic President which has the 
potential to impact prosecution of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has publicly 
expressed concern over the constitutionality of President Obama‟s engagement in military 
activity in Libya.   
This juxtaposition of parties, branches of government, and methods of conducting foreign 
policy has been replayed many times in our history, particularly since World War II, and it is a 
struggle that requires analysis and further understanding. 
 6 
The Nature of the Struggle 
 
While the power to command the armed forces has been clearly assigned to the President 
and his Cabinet,
3
 nowhere in the Constitution is it written that it is solely the job of the EB to 
craft foreign policy and resolve differences with nations through the use of force and military 
action.   
The President, as the head of the EB, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and 
head of state, is the face of American foreign policy projected to the world, and by precedent and 
tradition is understood domestically and abroad as the engine of such policy.  The Congress, 
however, is responsible for providing appropriations for the armed forces and is given the power 
of oversight in order to make educated legislative decisions and to evaluate the progress of 
actions taken by the EB.
4
   
In a political climate where the consensus on foreign policy is shared by the LB and EB, 
the relationship between the branches often works fluidly, and the job of developing policy is left 
to the President with little oversight from Congress, as was the case in 2003 when President 
George W. Bush sent troops into Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein‟s regime.  The Republican-
controlled LB authorized appropriations for this military campaign without much debate, and as 
the war dragged on well beyond the expected time frame and casualties and costs mounted, there 
was little pressure from the leadership in the LB to change the course of the war, even as public 
unrest grew and the Democratic minority called for change.   
                                                 
3
 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 2, Section 2.  
4
 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 8. 
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This public unrest led to a change in leadership in both chambers of the LB in 2006, and 
with this change came a fundamental difference in how the EB and LB felt the future of 
America‟s engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be handled, as well as how to deal with 
future threats America may face, including Iran and non-state actors.  Democrats took control of 
both chambers of the LB following the 2006 election with what they believed was a mandate for 
this change, and this mandate influenced their agenda in the early months of the 110
th
 Congress 
to reject the EB‟s policies.   
President Bush, however, maintained a steady course of action in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
even after his party became the minority in Congress for the first time since 1994, taking 
advantage of the inability of the Democratic leadership in the Senate to establish enough of a 
coalition with moderate Republicans to end filibusters and invoke cloture to pass legislation with 
a three-fifths majority.  He also maintained his policy of isolation with Iran, believing a 
diplomatic “time-out” and verbal posturing would alter the Iranian government‟s plans to 
proliferate its nuclear capability.   
In response to Bush‟s choice to stay the course on these issues, the Democratic leadership 
in the LB attempted to engage in its own foreign policy, passing legislation in direct defiance of 
Bush‟s plans in Iraq by calling for a reduction in troop levels and a timetable leading to an end of 
military engagement in Iraq, as well as taking steps to open diplomatic relations with Iran in an 
effort to resolve the differences America has with Iran without resorting to military engagement.   
These attempts were relatively unsuccessful in the 110
th
 Congress, however, as President 
Bush refused to sign into law any appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that 
included timetables for withdrawal or reductions of troops, and in vetoing such legislation, 
 8 
turned the spotlight on the leadership in the LB, blaming them for delaying necessary funding to 
keep American troops safe and to ensure their ability to claim victory on both fronts. 
Before delving further into the details of this political battle and others like it, a review of 
the constitutional and legislative provisions that provide guidance as to the rights and 
responsibilities of the LB and EB in this regard is necessary. 
 
Constitutional and Legislative Provisions 
 
Article 1, Section 8 
 
There are at least two arguments supporting Congress‟s authority to limit the President‟s 
ability to prosecute foreign policy in the Constitution.   
Under Article 1, Section 8, Congress has the power “To lay and collect Taxes…to…pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defence,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To provide 
and maintain a Navy,” “To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces,” “To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning 
Captures on Land and Water,” as well as “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and “To provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in 
the Service of the United States.”
5
 
                                                 
5
 U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq  
by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia and Thomas J. Nicola.  Washington: The Service, 2008, p. 3 
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In addition, this section of the Constitution empowers the Congress “To make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers…” as well 
as “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 




Article 1, Section 9 
 
The second constitutional text supporting Congress in this argument is in the next section 
of Article 1, which says “Congress has virtually plenary constitutional power over 
appropriations, one that is not qualified with reference to its powers in section 8.”
7
  Article 1, 
Section 9 goes on to say that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law.”
8
  This clarifies, and has been well established under judicial 
review, that “no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act 
of Congress” and that Congress can specify the conditions for the use of such funds, as long as 






From the point of view of the EB, Article 2, Section 1 appoints the President 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” and empowers him “by and 






 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 9. 
9
 U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq  
by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia and Thomas J. Nicola.  Washington: The Service, 2008, p. 3 
 10 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” authorized “from time to time [to] 
give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and [to] recommend to their 
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,” and bound to “take 




War Powers Resolution of 1973 
 
 After many years of prolonged conflict in Korea and Vietnam without a declaration of 
war, both chambers of the 93
rd
 Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was 
designed to prevent the perceived erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United 
States should be involved in military conflict.  This resolution was vetoed by President Richard 
Nixon, but his veto was overturned by a two-thirds majority of both the House of 
Representatives and Senate, and thus became PL 93-148. 
 By statute, PL 93-148 requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of 
committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining in theater 
for more than 60 days, with a further 30 day withdrawal period, without an authorization of the 
use of military force or a declaration of war.
11
   
 While this resolution was passed into law with the purpose of strengthening the LB‟s 
powers relative to declaring war, it could be argued this resolution has done the exact opposite.  
With the EB given the authority by law to mobilize troops for a period of time without an official 
                                                 
10
 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 2, Sections 1, 2 and 3. 
11
 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. 107th Congress, 2nd Session. United States  
Government Printing Office. 10 Oct 2002. 
 11 
declaration of war, the LB can only exercise its authority by rejecting the EB‟s objectives after 
troops and resources have already been committed.   
This presents not only a difficult logistical and financing situation for the Congress, but 
also a very difficult political decision, as it requires the LB to reject the motives of the EB with 




 As with many powers for which the federal government was deemed to be responsible, 
the framers of the Constitution may have sought to divide up the power to prosecute foreign 
policy to ensure a system of checks and balances was in place in determining whether wars 
should be fought and how they would be prosecuted.  While the above review of the Constitution 
and subsequent legislation details the powers granted to the EB and the LB to declare war and to 
determine the terms by which appropriations for such action will be used, respectively, the 
Congress “has traditionally left it up to the President to decide how much of the armed forces to 
employ in a given conflict.”
12
   
This precedent, however, seems to run contrary to the framers‟ intent for a separation of 
powers between the three branches of government.  The first three articles of the Constitution 
define the powers granted to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, respectively.  
While the defined powers did not and could not predict all circumstances for which one branch 
might seek to become more powerful than the others, the system of checks and balances was 
                                                 
12
 U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq  
by Jennifer K. Elsea, Michael John Garcia and Thomas J. Nicola.  Washington: The Service, 2008, p. 6 
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designed by the framers to create a system that allows one branch to limit another.  By defining 
in Article 1, Section 8 that the LB has the power to declare war, it can be presumed that the 
framers intended to check the power of the EB to prosecute military action.  The history of the 
roles of the two branches in the prosecution of military action, however, shows the EB‟s power 
in such situations has rarely been checked by the LB.   
A thorough review of such cases dating back to the beginning of American history, 
including war against Tripoli in 1801 and against Great Britain in 1812, provide for 
congressional declarations of war with very broad language and permission for the President to 
use all force necessary to provide for the defense of the nation.
13
  Through this precedent and 
much of the history which has followed, the perception, if not the law as dictated by statute, has 
provided for a strong EB with the power to engage in military conflict as the President and his 
Cabinet see fit, with a LB which authorizes funding for such action based on the 
recommendations of the President. 
While such a relationship may exist under the circumstances of one party controlling both 
branches of the government, instances of divided government may provide examples of the 
unwillingness of the Congress to submit to the authority of the President.   
 
The History of Divided Government 
 
 Since the creation of the modern American political parties (Democrats and 
Republicans), divided government has been a common occurrence.  Democrats and Republicans 
have been the dominant political parties in the House of Representatives and Senate since the 






 Congress in 1849, when the Whig Party lost control of the House.
14
  With the exception of 
the 34
th
 Congress from 1855-57, when the “Opposition” Party had control over the House, both 
chambers of the LB have been controlled by either Democrats or Republicans.
15
  The same is the 
case in the White House, with Millard Fillmore being the last member of the Whig Party to serve 




Instances of Divided Government 
 
Since the above-mentioned time when Democrats and Republicans have dominated the 
politics of the LB and EB, there have been 17 separate instances of divided government.  The 
table below details each instance, including instances of military engagement abroad during 
those periods in history.    The purpose of listing instances of military action is to shed light on 
periods of time when discussion of appropriating funds for military engagement abroad was 




                                                 
14
 Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present).  110th Congress, 1st Session.   





 The Presidents of the United States.  The White House.  2 Apr 2007.    
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/chronological.html.  
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Key: HR = House of Representatives, Sen = Senate, EB = Executive Branch, D = Democrat, R = Republican 




Years HR Sen EB Military Action 
36
th










 1875-79 D R R  
46
th
  1879-81 D D R  
48
th
 1883-85 D R R  
52
nd
 1891-93 D R R  
54
th
 1895-97 R R D  
62
nd
 1911-13 D R R  
65
th
  1917-19 R D D  
66
th
 1919-21 R R D World War I 
80
th

























 1995-2001 R R D NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia 
110
th
 2007-09 D D R 
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 
Operation Iraqi Freedom  
    
In the 17 separate instances of divided government in the era of modern political parties, 
disputes with foreign nations leading to military engagement took place during six of those 




  In the case of the 
84
th
 Congress from 1959-61, while major military action did not begin in Vietnam until 1965, the 
incursion in Vietnam began in 1959 under the Eisenhower administration with the deployment of 
military advisors to assist the pro-democracy forces in South Vietnam, and this assistance 
continued through the Kennedy administration and through the completion of the 86
th
 Congress.    
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With a clear understanding of the instances when the EB and LB were led by different 
parties, and the periods of time within those instances when military engagement took place, we 
must now review the appropriations process in Congress to provide a background on how the 
power of the purse may allow the LB to oppose the EB‟s policies. 
 
The Appropriations Process 
 
 Each year, the LB considers several appropriations measures which provide funding for 
numerous activities, including military operations and national defense.  The consideration of 
appropriations measures allows the LB to exercise the power granted to it under the Constitution, 
which states, “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.”
19
 
 While the power to appropriate is a legislative power, “the President has an important 
role in the appropriations process by virtue of his constitutional power to approve or veto entire 
measures, which Congress can only override by two-thirds vote of both chambers.  He also has 




 The Committees on Appropriations in both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
have jurisdiction over the annual appropriations measures, with each committee having 12 
subcommittees and each subcommittee having jurisdiction over one annual, regular 
appropriations bill that provides funding for individual departments and agencies under that 
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  Currently, the Subcommittees on Defense in both chambers have 
jurisdiction over defense spending and military operations, while the Subcommittees on the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs in both chambers have 
jurisdiction over our nation‟s foreign assistance and diplomatic programs. 
 
Annual Appropriations Cycle 
 
 The President initiates the annual budget cycle by submitting his annual budget for the 
upcoming fiscal year to Congress.  In his budget, he “recommends spending levels for various 
programs and agencies of the federal government in the form of budget authority…[which] 
refers to authority provided by federal law to enter into contracts or other financial obligations 




 Once the President submits his budget to Congress, the Congress is required under the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to adopt an annual budget 
resolution, which is essentially a response to the President‟s request.  This resolution sets new 
budget authority and outlay levels and allocates federal spending among specific functional 
categories, including national defense.  This resolution is never sent to the President, nor does it 
become law.  It also does not provide authority or raise or lower revenues.  Rather, it provides 




 Ibid., p. 2-3 
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 Consideration of appropriations measures vary in each chamber, and the tradition by 
which such process was maintained has changed in recent years.  Throughout history, the House 
of Representatives typically initiated consideration of appropriations measures, with the Senate 
then considering and amending those bills passed in the House.  In recent years, however, the 
Senate has taken up its own versions of these bills through its own appropriations 





Committee Consideration of Appropriations Bills 
 
 Once the President has submitted his budget, each subcommittee holds hearings on the 
segments of the budget under their jurisdiction.  This is the first opportunity for members of the 
LB on these subcommittees to debate the details of the President‟s request and, if deemed 
necessary through majority vote by the subcommittee, mark up and amend that request.  The 
subcommittees will seek testimony from agency officials, who are often appointed directly to 
their positions by the President, and non-governmental experts to provide a basis for justification 
for requests and will debate the merits of funding for certain programs and policy initiatives 
requested by the President.
25
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 Following hearings, the members of the subcommittee will introduce amendments, as 
requested, which will be voted upon individually by the whole subcommittee, and those 
approved by a majority will become part of the bill.  Once the final bill has been engrossed and 
voted upon by the whole subcommittee, it is referred to the full Committee on Appropriations for 
consideration, possibly further amendments, and eventually passage by the full committee.  The 
bill is then put on the calendar for its respective chamber to be considered by the full House or 
Senate.
26
     
 
House Floor Action 
 
 In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations reports the 12 
individual bills separately for consideration by the full House.  Each bill is reported and 
considered in May or June, and in a typical year, this process will be completed prior to the 
August recess.   
 Before floor consideration of an appropriations bill commences, the House Committee on 
Rules sets parameters, or a special rule, for floor consideration of the bill, defining how many 
and what kind of amendments can be presented on the floor and how much time is allotted for 
debate on that particular bill.  Upon adoption of the rule by the Committee on Rules, that 
particular appropriations bill immediately comes to the floor for consideration by the Committee 
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 The Committee of the Whole will then debate the bill, with time equally allotted to the 
majority and minority sides and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the 
subcommittee with jurisdiction over that particular bill.  Following general debate, amendments 
are considered as allowed for by the aforementioned rule and the standing rules of the House, 
which establish several requirements for amendments, including: 
 Germaneness to the bill under consideration 
 Compliance with the established separation between legislation and appropriations 
 Funding limits imposed by the congressional budget process 
 Provisions of any prior special rules or unanimous consent agreements 
Any amendment violating these rules can be challenged by any Representative through a point of 
order.
28
   
 Once the Committee of the Whole completes consideration of amendments, “it rises and 
reports the bill with any adopted amendments to the full House.  The House then votes on the 




Senate Floor Action 
 
In the Senate, appropriations bills are reported for consideration by the full Senate in June 
and are completed in September.   
Once an appropriations bill is reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the 
full Senate considers the bill.  Unlike the House, the Senate has no special rule setting parameters 
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for consideration, but may set some parameters through unanimous consent requests amongst the 
whole Senate.  In a much more simple and streamlined process than the House, the bill is 
brought to the floor, the chair and ranking minority member of the relevant subcommittee make 
opening statements, and debate commences without restrictions on time or when amendments 
can be introduced.
30
   
The Senate does share similar rules to the House regarding the type of amendments that 
may be introduced, with all of the above requirements except for the germaneness rule.  
Assuming an amendment meets these requirements, the Senate will allow for unlimited debate 




House and Senate Conference Action 
 
Following the completion of consideration of and passage of all 12 bills by both the 
House and Senate, the appropriations committees of both chambers spend the fall and winter 




The negotiators, called conferees or managers, “are generally required to remain within 
the scope of the differences between the positions of the two chambers and cannot add new 
matter.  Their agreement must be within the range established by the House- and Senate-passed 
versions.”  Once an agreement has been reached by the conference, the conference report is 
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produced and adopted by the first chamber, typically the House because of its role as the 
traditional initiator of appropriations bills, for consideration.
33
   
   Prior to consideration of the conference report by the House, a special rule waiving any 
points of order against the conference report is typically adopted.  As the first chamber to 
consider the conference report, the House has the option of voting to recommit it to the 
conference for further consideration if there are portions of the report the House will not pass, or 
it has the option of rejecting it or adopting it in full.
34
 
 Following the passage by one chamber, the conference is automatically disbanded, giving 
the second chamber, typically the Senate, two options: adopt or reject the conference report.  The 
Senate may, however, “strike new matter or new directed spending provisions from the 
conference report by points of order thereby rejecting it.  The Senate can avoid this situation by 
adopting a motion to waive the applicable rule by a three-fifths vote…”  If points of order are 
sustained, the offending language is stricken from the bill, and once all points of order are 
disposed of, “the Senate considers a motion to send the remaining provisions to the House as an 
amendment between the houses since they cannot amend the conference report.”
35
   
 The House then considers the amendment, and may choose to further amend the Senate 
amendment and return it to the Senate for further consideration, or choose to agree to the 
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 Under Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, the President has 10 days to sign or 
veto the measure after the Congress sends the bill to his desk.  “If he takes no action, the bill 
automatically becomes law at the end of the 10-day period.  Conversely, if he takes no action 
when Congress has adjourned, he may pocket veto the bill.”
37
 
If the President chooses to veto the bill, it is sent back to Congress, which may override 
the veto by a two-thirds vote in both chambers.  If the House and Senate are successful in 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
On the topic of congressional foreign policy in divided government, the preeminent 
publication to date is David R. Mayhew‟s Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and 
Investigations, 1946-1990.  The first to publish a comprehensive study on this issue, Mayhew‟s 
writing serves as the standard by which other political scientists have measured their analysis of 
the political behavior of the Congress during times of divided government. 
 In his introduction, Mayhew observes that divided party control in American national 
government is not a new phenomenon, as between 1946 and 1990, control of the presidency, the 
Senate, and the House was split for twenty-six of those forty-four years.
39
  From that 
observation, he questions whether voters should care whether party control is unified or divided 
and whether either arrangement produces a more or less effective government.   
Mayhew quotes a number of political scientists in trying to evaluate the need to 
investigate this political phenomenon, including Randall B. Ripley, who studied majority party 
leadership in Congress and said “to have a productive majority in the American system of 
government the President and a majority of both houses must be from the same party.”
40
  
Mayhew also cites Lloyd N. Cutler, who analyzed divided government in the 1980s and said 
“there has never been in modern days any successful domestic legislative program at a time of 
divided government.”
41
  Finally, Morris S. Ogul, who studied legislative supervision of the 
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bureaucracy, believes “a congressman of the president‟s party is less likely to be concerned with 
oversight than a member of the opposition party.”   
In his review of these authors and other prior research on the topic, Mayhew found a 
prevailing view that divided government means a less productive government, both in terms of 
effective legislation and proper oversight.  Mayhew expresses his belief, however, that the above 
claims are wrong, arguing that “unified as opposed to divided control has not made an important 
difference in recent times in the incidence of…high-publicity investigations in which 
congressional committees expose alleged misbehavior in the executive branch…[or] the 
enactment of a standard kind of important legislation.”
42
  Essentially, he hypothesizes that 
partisan differences in the two branches have no bearing on the success of the federal 
government to produce meaningful legislation or initiate investigations.     
 To prove his hypothesis, Mayhew used two main sources, the Washington Post and New 
York Times, as well as scholarly studies by policy specialists, to identify important laws passed 
in Congress between the years of 1946 and 1990, by which he would determine the success of a 
unified government versus a divided government.  The heart of his research is supported by two 
commonly accepted theses: that unified government “should generate, over a long period of time 
when contrasted with divided control, considerably more legislation” and that “Congress acting 
as an investigative body will give more trouble to the executive branch when a president of the 
opposite party holds power.”
43
 
 To identify what he deemed as “important laws,” Mayhew used two “sweeps” to produce 
a list of laws by which to evaluate the impact of divided government.  First, he surveyed end-of-
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the-Congress wrap-up stories from the Washington Post and New York Times to determine what 
laws contemporary observers felt were the most significant for that session.  This evaluation 
produced judgments from those evaluating the laws at the time they were passed.   
Mayhew‟s second sweep, retrospective judgment, was derived from long-term 
perspectives by policy specialists, complementing the first sweep by adding a dimension of 
expertise.  The combination of these two sweeps allowed Mayhew to compile a list of 267 




 Congresses.  These 267 laws were then 
detailed in a table and separated into those enacted under “divided party control” or “unified 
party control.”   
For the “important investigations” portion of his study, Mayhew reviewed front-page 
stories in the New York Times featuring charges of EB mismanagement or misbehavior or a 
response to such charges from the administration.  Mayhew found that thirty-one investigations 
during the above-stated period appeared on the front page at least 20 times.  He then took the 
thirty-one chosen investigations and separated them as “divided party control” or “unified party 
control” based on the political situation at the time the investigations occurred, ranking within 
each Congress, from top to bottom, the most publicized charges and investigations in the New 
York Times.   
 In his analysis of data relating to important legislation, Mayhew finds that “surprisingly, 
it does not seem to make all that much difference whether party control of the American 
government happens to be unified or divided,”
44
 finding an extensive list of constancy variables, 
including “norms, external events, various electoral incentives, cross-party opinion cleavages, 
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problem-solving propensities, and an arguably constant element of ease or difficulty associated 
with putting together winning Capitol Hill coalitions” that affect the ability to pass and enact 
legislation regardless of whether government is unified or divided.
45
    
 Regarding investigations, Mayhew finds that “it seems plausible to conclude that norms, 
electoral incentives, and perhaps events…of executive-branch corruption…contribute to 
constancy” in the way investigations are conducted by Congress, “so there is cause for 
investigations to occur constantly or at least randomly and often,” regardless of whether 
government is unified or divided.
46
 
 Mayhew thus concluded as he originally believed in his hypothesis that divided 
government has no tangible impact on the success of passing legislation or congressional 
oversight of the EB.  Mayhew‟s research on this topic, still in its infancy in the early 1990s, led 
to a surge of political scientists delving deeper into the relevance of divided government in 
American politics, producing some research that supports Mayhew‟s conclusions, along with 
some which rebuff Mayhew‟s claims. 
 Among the supporters of Mayhew‟s conclusions include George C. Edwards, III, Andrew 
Barrett and Jeffrey Peake, who uncover patterns of behavior by the President that evolve the 
discussion but maintain the same general conclusion; David R. Jones, who studies the 
fundamental breakdowns in the implicit arguments supporting the impact of divided government; 
and William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron and Charles Riemann, who expand the data 
set by which the impact of divided government can be analyzed and find minimal, if any, impact 
on the ability to produce meaningful legislation under divided rule. 
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Among the dissenters of Mayhew‟s views are David Menefee-Libey, who believes 
Mayhew wrongly focuses on the letter, rather than the spirit, of the definition of divided 
government in his analysis of its effect on political gridlock; Sean Q. Kelly, who uses Mayhew‟s 
own data sets to come to a completely opposite conclusion on the impact of divided government; 
and John J. Coleman, who firmly believes in the conventional wisdom that divided government 
impacts the ability to pass and enact meaningful and effective legislation and to open 




Edwards, Barrett and Peake 
 
 Among the authors who support Mayhew‟s conclusions are George C. Edwards, III, 
Andrew Barrett and Jeffrey Peake, who find in their own research that “Presidents oppose 
significant legislation more often under divided government, and much more important 
legislation fails to pass under divided government than under unified government.”
47
  They do 
conclude, however, that even with these findings, that divided government is only a constraint 
under certain circumstances, and share Mayhew‟s view that it is not as integral as conventional 
wisdom dictates.   
Using regression analysis to review legislation proposed in the LB from 1947-92, 
Edwards, Barrett and Peake confirmed Mayhew‟s findings by looking at legislation that failed to 
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be enacted, rather than that which succeeded during that same time span.  Their data set was 




 Seriously considered legislation – bills which were debated in a subcommittee or 
committee in at least one chamber of Congress 
 Significant legislation – constitutional amendments, Senate treaty ratifications, 
Supreme Court nominations, and defense authorizations 
 Potential for conflict – legislation for which the administration took a stand that could 
conflict with the Congress 
 Disaggregation – separate analyses of this final list of legislation in both chambers. 
 
From these sweeps, Edwards, Barrett and Peake produced a list of 519 bills that failed to 
pass, 217 of which were opposed by the EB and 302 of which were supported by the EB.  After 
analyzing the data associated with this legislation, they find that divided government does have a 
significant influence on the passage of important legislation.
49
  They found that “Presidents 
oppose significant legislation more often under divided government, and much more seriously 
considered, important legislation fails to pass under divided government then under unified 
government.”
50
   
They clarify, however, that their findings do not prove Mayhew wrong, as they can 
conclude clearly from their analysis that “divided government is a constraint only on the passage 
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of legislation that the administration opposes.”
51
  They find no relationship “between divided 
government and the amount of administration-supported potentially significant legislation that 
fails to pass,” and therefore conclude that “we should not assume that action by one institution to 
negate the policy intent of the other is necessarily bad” or indicative of an inability of a divided 
government to succeed in passing important legislation.
52




  In his study of party polarization and legislative gridlock, David R. Jones finds, similar 
to Mayhew, that “divided government does not affect gridlock once party polarization and party 
seat division are taken into account.”
53
  In his research on the legislative impact of divided 




 Passage in Congress requires support from only a simple majority in both chambers 
 Congress and the President must agree in order to break gridlock 
 The two major parties have distinctly different policy preferences 
 
Jones details in his analysis that fundamental breakdowns in these assumptions lead to 
breakdowns in the divided government hypothesis.  First, he proves the first argument incorrect 
by retorting that if that argument was true, then “unified government would guarantee that the 
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President‟s party had enough seats in Congress to pass its legislative agenda.”
55
  This is easily 
disproven by the need to achieve a three-fifth majority in the Senate to end a filibuster, and 
historically over the past half-century, such a majority has been difficult to achieve by either 
party. 
The second argument is also quickly proven wrong by Jones, as he points out that if the 
LB and EB must agree in order to break gridlock, “then presidential opposition to legislation 
passed by the majority party in Congress would prevent enactment during divided 
government.”
56
  There have been many documented instances, however, where the presidential 
veto has not been absolute, and a two-thirds majority in both chambers has been achieved to 
override the veto. 
Lastly, Jones quickly dispels the validity behind the argument that the two major parties 
have distinctly different policy preferences, arguing that “party preferences can be highly 
polarized in some cases and have a considerable degree of overlap in other cases.  When party 
preferences are significantly less polarized, members of one party may be no less likely to vote 
for a measure than members of the other party are.  In this case, divided government will not 
necessarily prevent agreement between the legislative and executive branches.”
57
 
Following the destruction of these arguments supporting the validity of divided 
government in legislative gridlock, Jones uses the importance of the filibuster, veto override, and 
variation in party polarization to construct an improved model of how parties affect legislative 
gridlock.  In doing so, Jones confirms Mayhew‟s conclusion that “unified government is not 
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necessarily any less prone to gridlock than divided government,” particularly “when parties are 
highly polarized and neither party has a large majority,” both of which has been the case for 




Howell, Adler, Cameron and Riemann 
 
In their study of the legislative productivity of Congress from 1945-94, William Howell, 
Scott Adler, Charles Cameron and Charles Riemann extend the data set of legislation from the 
couple of hundred that Mayhew believed to be “important” based on headlines and expert 
analysis, to the entirety of legislation passed during the fifty years of their analysis, 
encompassing all 17,663 public laws enacted during that period.  Through this data set, they 
demonstrate that “periods of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation 
by about 30%. Divided government, however, has no substantive effect on the production of 




By extending Mayhew‟s data to a complete analysis of legislation passed during a fifty 
year period in Congress, Howell et al. paint a complete picture of the role a divided government 




 Group A – landmark enactments: Mayhew‟s Sweep One public laws 
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 Group B – major enactments: all other public laws mentioned in the New York Times 
or Washington Post and greater than or equal to six pages of coverage in the CQ 
Almanac 
 Group C – ordinary enactments: all other public laws mentioned in the CQ Almanac 
 Group D – minor enactments: all remaining public laws including commemorative 
legislation 
 
By splitting legislation into these four distinct groups, Howell et al. discover trends in all 
four groups being evaluated that periods of divided government “depress the production of 
landmark legislation,” but this effect “attenuates for less enactments (Groups B and C) and 
reverses for the least-significant laws.”
61
   
Additionally, they find that divided government “appears to increase the production of 
legislation deemed very important solely in retrospective reviews,” leading them to posit that 
“Mayhew‟s no-effect finding on divided government and legislative productivity is a 
consequence of aggregating two quite different series, one based on contemporaneous 
perceptions, with a divided effect, and one based on retrospective evaluations, with a reverse 
effect.”   
Howell et al. suggest that “measures based on contemporaneous perceptions are more 
meaningful for studying the politics of divided government.”
62
  So, while Howell et al. have 
criticisms for Mayhew‟s method of analysis and data sets, they produce no findings to distinctly 
rebut his conclusions. 
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 Among the authors who reject Mayhew‟s conclusions is David Menefee-Libey, who 
posits in Divided Government as Scapegoat that divided government, in and of itself, “doesn‟t 
measure up as a serious problem either in managerial terms or by democratic criteria” and that it 
is “standing in as the target of our real frustrations with the nonperformance of the federal 
government” rather than serving as the source of political gridlock.
63
   
While this view may seem to reflect a certain level of agreement with Mayhew‟s 
conclusion, Menefee-Libey completely rejects Mayhew‟s belief in the need to review divided 
government as an entity that may influence the success of legislation and challenges whether 
divided government is a symptom of a problem like Mayhew believes, or rather a deliberate 
action by voters seeking balance in government.  
 Menefee-Libey argues that Mayhew and others of his school of thought wrongly focus on 
the letter, rather than the spirit, of the definition of divided government, creating a narrow 
definition that misses periods when the President‟s party did not control the LB, including 
periods when the opposite party controlled the LB by a mere few votes, or when members of the 
majority party in the LB who subscribed to a particular ideology (i.e., Blue Dog Democrats) 
voted frequently with the minority party and weakened the power of the majority. 
 Menefee-Libey attributes two possible explanations for the renewed concern about 
divided government as an excuse for a problem he identifies as having remained relatively 
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consistent for decades.  One is “that the perceived policy effects of divided government have 
only recently become truly frightening.”
64
  A combination of budget deficits and national debt, 
health care and insurance crises, environmental degradation, the energy crisis, and other growing 
concerns, both foreign and domestic, have produced an environment demanding action.  Reform 
advocates argue, however, “that divided government makes such action almost impossible.”
65
 
 His second explanation is that “we have until recently considered divided government an 
electoral accident.”
66
  For most of the twentieth century, divided government happened most 
often during off-year elections as a show of electoral opposition to the party of the sitting 
president, most often followed by a change of party leading the EB the following election, 
returning the two branches to a coalition.  Any case of divided government in years of 
presidential elections was viewed by many as having been decided by a small set of swing 
voters.  There was no belief in the political science community that divided government was an 
intentional act by voters.
67
 
 This perception of the creation of divided government led to the blame for such a 
situation falling on the parties, following the belief that “if they would come together and present 
clear programs to the voters…the swing voters would settle down and elect a united and 
effective government.”
68
  Only recently, Menefee-Libey points out, has the political science 
community and students of voting behavior identified serious evidence “that a large number of 
voters consistently seek divided government” and that “presidential and congressional elections 
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are simply about different things.”
69
  
 Menefee-Libey cites the work of Morris P. Fiorina, who in his study of Congress in 1989 
found this difference in perception of presidential and congressional elections in the minds of 
voters, and discovered that “voters want a president who can govern the whole country, but they 
select Senators and Representatives who will serve the particular interests of their states and 
districts.”
70
  With this information, Menefee-Libey concludes divided government is not an 
accident, and thus rejects the argument that such a situation causes managerial problems in 
government.   
In this way, Menefee-Libey in general agrees with Mayhew‟s conclusion that divided 
government is not the cause of gridlock in government, but categorically rejects the premise by 
which Mayhew and his cohorts even propose divided government as a possible cause worth 
researching.  To Menefee-Libey, an instance of divided government is symptomatic of a desire 
for balance in government by the electorate from which he places blame of government gridlock 
on the electorate‟s choice, rather than the view of Mayhew and his cohorts that failure to pass 
legislation falls on fractures between parties leading different branches.
71
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 In his reassessment of Mayhew‟s findings, Sean Q. Kelly uses Mayhew‟s data and model 
to demonstrate that divided government does indeed have a significant negative impact on the 
emergence of innovative policy.
72
   
Kelly argues that Mayhew does not take advantage of the unique data he collects, 
“lump[ing] together policies regardless of whether the policy was arrived at through” his first 
method of data collection, the collection of front-page stories in the New York Times and 
Washington Post, or the second method, retrospective judgment on the part of policy experts.
73
  
Kelly believes legislation confirmed as important by the second method should be weighted 
higher than legislation Mayhew chooses from the first method but is not confirmed to be 
important in retrospect.  In addition, he believes legislation deemed important in retrospect, but 
not at the time of their passage, should be removed from consideration.
74
   
These reevaluations of data significantly reduce the number of pieces of legislation under 
review, but using the same method of analysis as Mayhew, allow Kelly to conclude that 
Mayhew‟s results are less definitive than they seem, and that in his opinion, divided government 
does make a difference.
75
  Kelly finds that type 1 policy, which he defines as the legislation that 
Mayhew defines as innovative policy, is not impacted by divided government as Mayhew 
concludes.  In reviewing Kelly‟s refinement of Mayhew‟s data set, which he calls type 2 policy, 
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Kelly finds that divided government does have an impact.
76
  The fundamental difference between 
the two types, Kelly explains, is that his refinement of the data examines policy that “is not just 
the promise of a law, or just the performance of the law, but rather the intersection of promise 
and performance.”
77
   
Kelly posits that rather than believing Mayhew‟s definitive answer, that “research into 
the puzzle of divided government is in its infancy,” that Mayhew just misidentified how to define 
what data set properly explores the effect of divided government.  He also points out that many 
questions, including the consequences of divided government, the level of conflict between the 
branches of government, and the legitimacy of the American political system during divided 






Another political scientist who believes the conventional wisdom of the effect of divided 
government on the enactment of significant public policy is valid is John J. Coleman, who in his 
piece Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness finds that “various 




Coleman breaks the discussion of the relative productivity of divided government since 
the end of World War II into four distinct stages.  In the 1940s and 1950s, Coleman says that 
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party government theorists “complained that public policymaking in the United States was 
fragmented and inconsistent because of constitutional structure and the decentralized nature of 
party politics.”
80
  This argument shifted towards criticism of “interest group liberalism” and the 
parceling out of government authority to interest groups and limited democratic access in the 
1960s, and then expanding into concern over “an onslaught of unfiltered interest groups 
demands” and the need to restrict democratic inputs into the policymaking system in the 1970s.
81
  
Finally, in the 1980s, the discussion shifted to the paradigm of today, concluding the main fault 




To test his own hypothesis that the conventional wisdom is valid, Coleman uses 
Mayhew‟s data set, as well as that of Sean Q. Kelly, a counterpart of his in opposition to 
Mayhew, and measures of failed legislation produced by George C. Edwards, III, Andrew 
Barrett and Jeffrey Peake, whose research supports Mayhew, to produce figures indicating the 
percentage of important legislation enacted under different circumstances of divided party 
control, as well as what percentage of said legislation was opposed by the EB in each case. 
From this analysis of a range of conceptions of “significant legislation,” Coleman finds 
that the answer is “yes” in most cases when analyzing “whether unified government is associated 
with the passage of more such enactments.”
83
  His explanation for this is that “although studies 
of unified versus divided government often cite party government theorists, scholars tend to 
ignore the nuance of the original arguments by conflating them with the less precise arguments 
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of unified government enthusiasts of the 1980s and early 1990s.”
84
  In doing so, according to 
Coleman, Mayhew and his camp have missed how the differences between Democratic versus 
Republican unified government, intraparty factionalism, responsiveness to public opinion, and 
Senate supermajorities contribute to policy achievements under unified government.
85




 In analyzing Mayhew‟s original thesis and conclusions, along with that of those who 
followed him on this topic both in support and in opposition, it is clear that there is not one 
definitive way of determining the effect of divided government on effective policy making in 
contemporary American politics.  Each of the political scientists to follow Mayhew in analyzing 
this topic, including those who generally support his hypothesis and conclusions, find flaws in 
the method of his research or expose unanswered questions that contribute to the dialogue of 
whether divided government is truly the cause of legislative inaction, or maybe just a symptom 
of a greater institutional problem.   
None of these political scientists, however, have done specific research on the impact of 
divided government on legislation specific to foreign policy, or even more specifically, the 
appropriation of funding for military action.  While the two sides of this argument differ on the 
impact of party polarization on the divided government thesis, as it relates to the prosecution of 
military action since World War II, few can deny that such decisions often create great 
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polarization between the two parties, most significantly noticed during the Vietnam era in the 
1960s and 1970s, as well as the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
 In this regard, Mayhew‟s research, as well as that of those who have expanded the 
discussion of this important topic, benefits the political science community in refining the 
methods by which the impact of divided government on policymaking can be evaluated, and the 
refining of research methods can provide the political science community with a more accurate 
way of evaluating the important relationship between the EB and LB on an issue that will likely 
define the voting behavior of the electorate, and thus, the relationship between these branches for 















CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Research of Impact of Independent Variables 
  
In order to determine the causal relationship between certain variables and the role the 
LB plays in the creation of foreign policy during periods of divided government, each of the 
variables that have been identified (public opinion, budget constraints, and relative size of 
majority) must be analyzed to determine the individual impact they may play in the way 




Public opinion, generally determined by political polling, is often referred to as a key 
factor in a healthy democracy.  Whether polls actually impact the way the EB or the LB enact 
policy has often been disputed, but is an important question to be answered as definitively as 
possible in this discussion since the LB faces re-election every two years and is more likely to 
make policy decisions based on public opinion than the President, who is re-elected every four 
years and is not directly responsible to an electorate. 
 Paul Burstein‟s review of public opinion‟s impact on public policy in 2003 is one of the 
most comprehensive analyses in recent years.  In The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: 
A Review and an Agenda, Burstein asks how much impact public opinion has, how that impact 
increases as the salience of the issue increases, to what extent this impact is blunted by interest 
groups, political parties or other organizations, whether the responsiveness of the government to 
 42 




 Burstein found “that public opinion influences policy most of the time, often strongly,” 
and that “public opinion matters even in the face of activities by interest organizations, political 
parties, and political and economic elites.”  According to his data, which assigned coefficients to 
issues based on their time periods and calculated the input of public opinion on policy relative to 
the responsiveness of government, public opinion affects policy three-quarters of the time its 
impact is gauged, and is largely still impactful even alongside the activities of interest groups, 
political parties or other organizations.
87
 
 While this may prove true, is there a difference between the impact of public opinion on 
the EB, which is elected indirectly through the Electoral College, and the LB, which is elected 
directly by a smaller, more local constituency? 
 To determine the impact public opinion may have had on decisions to take on the policies 
of the EB and LB during periods of divided government, and whether there is a difference 
between the impact of public opinion on the two branches, polling data taken during these 
periods of time and during the military conflicts chosen for this report will be evaluated to 
determine public opinion of each particular military conflict, as well as the opinion of the job of 
both the EB and the LB during that time, to determine whether there was public support for the 
LB to oppose the President and his policy. 
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The waxing and waning of foreign policy budget trends appear to be a result of many 
factors, one of which is fiscal policy.  According to a report produced by the Congressional 
Research Service in June 2006, “international affairs funding decisions…are influenced…by the 
overall U.S. budget environment and constraints that exist particularly during periods of 
deficits.”
88
  Such a variable is specifically relevant “when fiscal austerity or domestic 
requirements were deemed to be of greater importance,” with the terrorist attacks of September 




To discover what relationship fiscal policy and the economic conditions of a particular 
time may have on the decisions of the LB to reject the EB‟s requests for funding of a military 
conflict, indexes of economic conditions will be reviewed from those periods of time.  By 
looking at unemployment rates, inflation rates, and the national debt, three pertinent and reliable 
indicators of economic conditions, and then comparing those figures to any actions taken by the 
LB to reject or alter Presidential appropriations request, we can glean whether this variable plays 
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Relative Size of Majority 
 
The size of the majority that is held in either chamber of the LB may have an impact on 
its ability to pursue certain policy or to challenge the authority of the EB.  While the party 
holding 218 seats in the House of Representatives technically has a majority, 290 votes are 
required to overturn a presidential veto, which is effectively the only way for the House of 
Representatives to unilaterally oppose the opinion of the EB on any legislation, including 
appropriations, that require his signature.  The same holds true to an even greater extent in the 
Senate, where a party technically holds a majority with 51 seats, but needs 60 votes to invoke 
cloture and prevent a filibuster by the minority party, and an even more ambitious 67 votes to 
overturn a presidential veto. 
 These circumstances not only provide the EB with a tremendous amount of power to 
dictate legislative activity whether they are working in concert with or in opposition to the LB, 
but also the minority party, which in the case of divided government aligns with the EB, with the 
ability to prevent the majority party from overturning the will of the EB.  This influence, 
however, is relative to the size of the majority that is held. 
 To determine the impact the size of the majority in the LB may have on the its‟ activities 
and agenda, the demographics of both the House of Representatives and the Senate during 
periods of divided government since World War II, and specifically during periods of military 
conflict, will be analyzed.  This data will then compared to appropriations requests in the LB for 
funding, or possibly defunding, of military engagements to determine whether the actual size of 
the majorities plays a factor in whether the LB contests the will of the EB. 
 45 
Research of Appropriations Requests 
 
 The dependent variable in this research project is the request for appropriations for 
military engagement, which is made by the LB based on both the President‟s budget request at 
the beginning of the year, as well as its own evaluation of needs, and is later considered, possibly 
amended, and eventually passed by the two chambers of Congress (as described in Chapter 1).  
With the separation of powers, as defined by the Constitution, and the traditional role of the EB 
in defining foreign policy, the power of the purse is the primary tool through which the LB may 
influence and possibly create its own policy in this realm. 
 As defined earlier, there are four major military conflicts that have occurred during 
instances of divided government since World War II: the Vietnam War, the First Gulf War in 
Iraq and Kuwait, the NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia, and Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
 
The Vietnam War 
 
 The Vietnam War officially began in 1959 under the Eisenhower administration with the 
deployment of military advisors to assist the pro-democracy forces in South Vietnam, and 
officially ended in 1975 with the final withdrawal of American forces occurring on April 30 of 
that year.  During this military conflict, there were two separate instances of divided government 
with the Democrats controlling the LB from 1959-61 with Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican, 
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serving as President and from 1969-1975 with Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, both also 
Republicans, serving as President. 
 In this vein, legislative records from the 86
th





 Congresses (1969-75) will be reviewed in an effort to locate appropriations requests 
or other relevant legislation related to the funding of the Vietnam War to determine if the LB 
attempted to influence the prosecution of this often controversial war through denial of funding 
or rejection of administration policy. 
 
The First Gulf War 
 
 The First Gulf War, which was fought from August 2, 1990 through February 28, 1991 in 
both Kuwait and Iraq, occurred under the administration of President George Herbert Walker 
Bush, a Republican, and during the 101
st
 Congress, when Democrats controlled both the House 
and Senate.  This conflict had two distinct periods:  
 Operation Desert Shield, from August 2, 1990 through January 11, 1991, during 
which the United States mobilized its military in Saudi Arabia and, through the 
United Nations, built a coalition of nations providing both military and financial 
support for the upcoming effort to liberate Kuwait from Iraq‟s occupation. 
 Operation Desert Storm, from January 12 through February 28, 1991, during which 
direct combat between coalition forces and the Iraqi military occurred. 
The entirety of this military conflict occurred between the end of the 101
st
 and beginning 
of the 102
nd
 Congress.  Thus, appropriations requests and legislation authorizing military action 
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during those two Congresses will be analyzed to determine if the LB in any way rejected the 
Bush administration‟s efforts to engage in and fund this conflict. 
 
NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia 
 
 From 1995 through 1999, the United States was directly involved, both through military 
power and through funding, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s (NATO) intervention in 
Yugoslavia.  This engagement occurred during two different periods: 
 Operation Deliberate Force, from August 30 through September 20, 1995, during 
which time NATO forces attempted to undermine the military capability of the Army 
of the Republic of Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 Operation Noble Anvil, from March 24 through June 10, 1999, during which time 
NATO forces launched air strikes against the Yugoslav military in an effort to force 
them to withdraw from the Republic of Kosovo. 
Both periods of engagement occurred during the presidency of William J. Clinton, a 
Democrat, and Republican-controlled Congresses.  Operation Deliberate Force occurred during 
the 104
th
 Congress and Operation Noble Anvil occurred during the 106
th
 Congress.  In this vein, 
appropriations requests and legislation authorizing military action during these two periods of 
time will be analyzed to determine if any efforts existed to prevent President Clinton from 





Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
 Operation Enduring Freedom, the official name for the Global War on Terror, and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, also known as the Iraq War, both began during a period of Republican-
controlled EBs and LBs, and were prosecuted during a period of Democratic-controlled EBs and 
LBs in the 111
th
 Congress.  During the 110
th
 Congress in 2007-09, however, President George 
W. Bush, a Republican, faced off against a Democratic-controlled LB in a period of divided 
government that came during a critical point in determining the future of both of these conflicts. 
 Operation Enduring Freedom, which has had separate subordinate operations in 
Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Trans Sahara, and Kyrgyzstan, began on 
October 7, 2001 and has primarily been fought in Afghanistan.  The United States has led a 
coalition of forces, organized by NATO, during this period of time but has been responsible for a 
significant majority of the financing, supplies, and military forces made available to prosecute 
this military engagement.  Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003 and, aside from 
assistance from the militaries of the Republic of Turkey and peacekeeping forces provided by the 
United Kingdom, has been fought and funded primarily by the United States.   
  Appropriations requests during the 110
th
 Congress, from 2007-09, will be analyzed to 
determine if the Democratic-controlled LB attempted to exert its authority to block funding and 





CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
 




 The weight that public opinion has on how policy is created and enacted has been 
debated for as long as our democracy has existed.  Polling can both capture the feeling of the 
nation on a particular topic and provide a measure of satisfaction for a particular individual or 
entity in government to express the national opinion of their job performance.  Based on the 
findings of Paul Burstein in his review of public opinion‟s impact on public policy, it could be 
surmised that public opinion weighs heavily on the actions of the LB under the circumstances 
being analyzed.   
With that, the goal of this portion of the analysis is to locate polling data for the public 
opinion of the performance of the EB, the LB, and of the military action at that particular point in 
time.  While Gallup, one of the pre-eminent polling organizations in the United States and 
around the world, has been polling the American public on their opinion of the President and the 
various wars the United States has engaged in as far back as this study requires, such data 
relevant to public opinion about the job performance of the LB was not consistently kept as far 
back as this study requires, and thus was unattainable prior to 1975.   
These variables, for the purpose of statistical analysis, will be called pubopcon, pubopprz, 
and pubopwar, and will be measured on a scale of 1-5 by the following criteria: 
1. Significant support (greater than 60% support) 
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2. Marginal support (between 52% and 59.9% support) 
3. Indifferent (between 48.1% and 51.9% support) 
4. Marginal opposition (between 40.1% and 48%) 
5. Significant opposition (less than 40% support) 
 
Opinion of the President 
 
 Gallup has been studying human nature and behavior for more than 70 years and has 
been regularly tracking job approval ratings for presidents since Harry Truman in April 1945. 
 Below are graphs representing the approval rating trends for all of the presidents who 
served during periods of divided government and concurrently during military conflicts: Dwight 
D. Eisenhower during the early years of the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon during the Vietnam 
War, Gerald R. Ford during the Vietnam War, George H. W. Bush during the First Gulf War, 
Bill Clinton during NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, and George W. Bush during Operation 
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Figure 1 – Gallup historical polling data expressing Dwight D. Eisenhower’s approval ratings 
  
From this data, it is clear that President Eisenhower enjoyed high approval ratings during 
the period of his presidency during which he began sending military advisors to assist South 
Vietnam.  From 1959 through to the end of his term, Eisenhower‟s approval ratings were nearly 
always over 58 percent, with exception for a short period of time in the middle of 1960 when his 
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Figure 2 - Gallup historical polling data expressing Richard Nixon’s approval ratings 
  
From this data, it appears President Nixon, whose entire time in office ran concurrently 
with the Vietnam War, enjoyed an approval rating of at least 50 percent consistently until the 
middle of 1973, which was roughly the same time that he and members of his administration 
were implicated in the Watergate Scandal.  From this point until his resignation in 1974, his 
approval ratings were at or below 30 percent.  While attitudes about the prosecution of the 
Vietnam War may have contributed to Nixon‟s poor approval ratings, it is reasonable to attribute 










Figure 3 - Gallup historical polling data expressing Gerald R. Ford’s approval ratings 
  
The Vietnam War officially ended on April 30, 1975, meaning President Ford served for 
one year of this conflict under divided government.  Coming into office following the first 
president ever to resign from office, Ford initially enjoyed a high approval rating of more than 70 
percent, but his rating continually sank until it settled around 40 percent and remained there until 
the end of the Vietnam War.  Once the war officially ended, his rating did increase and leveled 









Figure 4 - Gallup historical polling data expressing George H. W. Bush’s approval ratings 
  
George H. W. Bush was a very popular president through the first three years of his 
presidency until the economic recession of 1992 took hold and eventually contributed to his 
defeat to Bill Clinton in 1993.  During the First Gulf War, however, Bush enjoyed among the 
highest approval ratings in the history of polling on this topic.   
 During Operation Desert Shield, from August 1990 until early January 1991, Bush‟s 
ratings initially were in the middle of the 70
th
 percentile, sunk to around 55 percent, and slowly 
began an ascent to around 60 percent.  Once Operation Desert Storm began on January 11, and 
continued until the end of the war on February 28, Bush‟s ratings shot up to over 80 percent 









Figure 5 - Gallup historical polling data expressing Bill Clinton’s approval ratings 
  
Bill Clinton‟s years in office were among the most prosperous economically in the 
history of the United States, but his failure to pass health care reform legislation in his first two 
years in office, as well as personal scandal later in his second term, hurt his approval ratings at 
various points. 
 Operation Deliberate Force in Serbia occurred during the first three weeks of September 
1995.  During this month, Clinton‟s rating was around 47 percent.  Operation Noble Anvil in 
Kosovo was prosecuted from late March through early June 1999, and during this period of time, 
Clinton‟s approval ratings ranged from the low 50
th









Figure 6 - Gallup historical polling data expressing George W. Bush’s approval ratings 
  
George W. Bush enjoyed a huge spike in approval immediately after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, but his approval rating continually sank as time went on throughout the 
remaining seven years of his time in office.  Operation Enduring Freedom officially began in 
early October 2001 in Afghanistan and, while it often took a backseat to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, was prosecuted throughout the rest of his term.  Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 













Opinion of Congress 
 
 Gallup has been tracking approval ratings of the Congress since 1974.  Below is a graph 
measuring approval and disapproval of the way Congress is handling its job, as determined by 
Gallup, from 1974 through 2008.   
 
 
Figure 7 - Gallup historical polling data expressing approval and disapproval of Congress 
  
From this graph provided by Gallup, it does not appear that public opinion has a direct 
relationship with the way in which the LB, regardless of which party was in power at a particular 
time, would have enacted policy.  With exception to the period immediately following the 
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terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, overall approval of the way the LB has been handling its 
job has been low.
97
  
 Analysis of this graph shows little to no direct relationship between the public opinion of 
the job performance of the LB and the enactment of policy, since there has been a general 
disapproval of Congress during the period such polls have been taken, regardless of whether the 
United States was at war or which party was in power in the LB.   
Looking specifically at periods of time during which divided government occurred, job 
approval of Congress ranged between 25% and 40% from 1975-77, between 19% and 41% from 
1981-93, between 30% and 53% from 1995-2001, and between 19% and 31% from 2007-08.  
Similarly, the disapproval rating of the job of Congress ranged in those same time periods on the 
opposite side of the spectrum, with disapproval ranging between 43% and 59% from 1975-77, 
between 39% and 79% from 1981-93, between 29% and 66% from 1995-2001, and between 
55% and 77% from 2007-08.
98
   
Overall, public opinion of the LB during this period of time has been low, and with the 
minor exception of the period of time immediately after September 11, 2001, a majority of the 
American people have not approved of the way the LB has been doing its job, whether during an 
era of divided government or not, and whether the United States was involved in a military 
conflict or not.  Therefore, there does not appear to be a direct relationship between the public 
opinion of Congress and its creation and enactment of policy during periods of divided 
government. 
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Opinion of Military Engagements – Vietnam  
 
 Starting in 1965, Gallup began polling the American public on various aspects of the 
conflict in Vietnam.  A specific question, “Was it a mistake to send troops to Vietnam?” was 
asked on a relatively consistent basis from 1965 through 1973, thereby encompassing a 
significant portion of the period of divided government that overlapped the Vietnam War. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Gallup poll indicating disapproval of decision to send troops to Vietnam 
  
From this graph provided by Gallup expressing the historical trend of answers to this 
specific question, in 1969, when divided government began, a clear majority of Americas polled 
believed sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake.  Starting at 52 percent in January 1969, the 
percentage of Americans who believed sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake maintained 
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levels in the high 50
th
 percentile through 1970, and then edged over 60 percent into 1971 and 
through 1973, when polling of this question ended until 1990.
99
   
This polling data clearly expresses the opposition to the war in Vietnam over that period 
of time, and from this information, it is clear that the Democratic Congress had public support 
for its efforts to reverse the course of the war in Vietnam.   
 
Opinion of Military Engagements – First Gulf War 
 
 During both the period leading up to the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, the 
operational name for the First Gulf War, and throughout the six weeks of the operation, Gallup 
polled the public on, less specifically than their opinion about this actual war, but more generally 
on the question of whether war is still necessary.
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 This question had been asked frequently between 1971 and 1990, with approximately 
half of Americans believing that war is sometimes necessary, with the other half believing war 
was outmoded.
101
  Also, in August 1990, when threats from Saddam Hussein against Iraq‟s 
neighbor, Kuwait, began, “only 31% of Americans favored using U.S. planes to bomb Iraqi 
targets, and only 32% favored sending in U.S. Marines and Army ground troops to defend 
Kuwait.”
102
  In November of 1990, only 37% favored going to war against Iraq, even if the 
situation did not change. 
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However, with Iraq‟s occupation of Kuwait, and with attempts by the United States and 
the United Nations to handle the situation through diplomacy falling short, public opinion 
supporting war increased.
103
  One week after Operation Desert Storm began (January 23-26, 
1991), 55% of Americans believed war is sometimes necessary, while 37% believed war is an 
outmoded way of settling differences.  As the war moved quickly and successfully for the allied 
forces, there was a significant positive shift, with 76% believing war was sometimes necessary in 
the first week of February 1991.
104
  Overall, for the short duration of this conflict, public opinion 
and national morale remained very high.    
 
Opinion of Military Engagements – NATO in Yugoslavia 
  
 Gallup tracked public opinion relating to the conflict in the Balkans in the early 1990s, 
and asked questions to gauge support for the United States becoming involved in both Bosnia in 
1995 and in Kosovo in 1999.  The question asked during the Bosnia conflict was “Do you think 
the United States needs to be involved in Bosnia in order to protect its own interests, or don’t 
you think so?” with the same question being asked during engagement in Kosovo, with the 
question identical but reflecting Kosovo, as opposed to Bosnia.
105
    
Overall, public opinion was against intervention in Bosnia, with a clear majority of 
Americans opposing involvement both before and immediately after Operation Deliberate Force.  
In fact, polling done in June 1995, less than two months prior to the beginning of NATO‟s 
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bombing of Bosnia, showed that 63 percent, nearly two-thirds of those polled, did not think the 
United States should be involved in Bosnia, with only 30 percent supporting.  Support increased 
slightly following the resumption of this operation in November 1995, with 52 percent opposing 
American efforts and 36 percent supporting, but overall, a majority of the American people did 
not agree with President Clinton‟s choice to engage in the Balkans.
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 Equally, right at the time the United States began to engage in Operation Noble Anvil in 
Kosovo, public opinion was against this operation, with an even 50 percent opposing American 
involvement and 42 supporting American involvement.  These numbers did reflect an increase in 
support by five percent from the previous month and overall greater support for involvement in 
Kosovo than there had been in Bosnia four years earlier, but they do also reflect that a majority 
of Americans were opposed to President Clinton‟s continued involvement with NATO‟s efforts 




Opinion of Military Engagements – Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
Gallup began tracking public opinion on Operation Iraqi Freedom shortly after the United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003, and the graph below shows the changes in public opinion over the 
duration of the conflict through January 2008, thus providing insight into the mood of the public 
regarding this conflict, including the first year during which divided government and this 
military conflict overlapped. 







Figure 9 - Gallup historical polling data expressing approval and disapproval of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
  
Midway through 2004, after an initial spike of support for operations in Iraq, the opinion 
of the American people became mixed, with opinion on whether sending troops to Iraq was a 
mistake hovering around 50% through the middle of 2005.  Starting in 2006, however, 
disapproval increased steadily through early 2008, and throughout 2007, which was the first year 
of divided government, disapproval of the war ranged in the high 50
th





   
This poll clearly indicates that public opinion was against Operation Iraqi Freedom 
during the period of divided government and thus may have provided adequate support for the 
Democrats in Congress seeking to redeploy troops from Iraq to oppose the will of President Bush 
and his policies. 
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Gallup has also been polling Americans regarding Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, which has been ongoing since October 2001, since the beginning of the conflict.  
Periodically over that time, Gallup has asked the question “Thinking now about U.S. military 
action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the United States made a mistake 
in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not?”  The graph below, provided by Gallup, shows 
historical polling data regarding support for this military engagement.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Gallup historical polling data expressing approval and disapproval of Operation Enduring Freedom 
  
From this data, it is evident that a significant majority of the American people have 
supported military action in Afghanistan over the duration of the conflict, including during the 
period of divided government in the 110
th
 Congress.  Initially, when the operation began 
immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, support for the operation was 
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overwhelming at 93 percent at the beginning of 2002.  While this high level of support slowly 
slid down near 70 percent, support for this conflict stayed in this range consistently through the 
middle of 2008.  Support temporarily dipped into the low 60
th
 percentile leading into the 2008 
election, but for the duration of the conflict, at least two-thirds of those polled do not believe it 








Unemployment figures are maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the 
Department of Labor on a monthly basis.  This variable, for the purpose of statistical analysis, 
will be called unemploy, and will be measured on a scale of 1-4 by the following criteria: 
1. Below normal (less than 4.0% unemployment) 
2. Normal (between 4.0% and 4.9% unemployment) 
3. Above normal (between 5.0% and 6.9% unemployment) 
4. Critical (greater than 7.0% unemployment) 
 
From the database provided by the BLS, monthly unemployment rates for all of the years 
during which instances of divided government occurred since 1948 (while the first divided 
government instance after World War II began in 1947, unemployment data is available only 
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beginning in 1948) have been obtained.  The unemployment rate is calculated by dividing the 
total number of unemployed workers by the total labor force, and the generally agreed-upon 
normal frictional unemployment rate amongst economists is 4.5%, so all monthly rates above 
4.5% are bolded and shaded in grey. 
 
Table 2 – Monthly Unemployment Rates in the U.S. during Instances of Divided Government, Post-World War II 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1948 3.4 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.0 
1955 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2 
1956 4.0 3.9 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.2 
1957 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 
1958 5.8 6.4 6.7 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.4 7.1 6.7 6.2 6.2 
1959 6.0 5.9 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.3 
1960 5.2 4.8 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.5 6.1 6.1 6.6 
1969 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 
1970 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.1 
1971 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.8 6.0 6.0 
1972 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.2 
1973 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.9 
1974 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.6 7.2 
1975 8.1 8.1 8.6 8.8 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.2 
1976 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 
1981 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.3 8.5 
1982 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.8 10.8 
1983 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10.1 9.4 9.5 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.3 
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Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1984 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.3 
1985 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0 
1986 6.7 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.6 
1987 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.7 
1988 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 
1989 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 
1990 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.3 
1991 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.7 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.3 
1992 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.4 7.4 
1995 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 
1996 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.4 
1997 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 
1998 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 
1999 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 
2000 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
2007 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 




Historical data on the rate of inflation, or the rate of increase of the consumer price index, 
in the United States is also available through the BLS, Department of Labor, and is available 
through 1947, the beginning of the first instance of divided government after World War II.  This 
data is kept by month and is averaged out for each year.  Generally, a range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent 
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is considered an acceptable range of inflation by banks and most economic theorists and 
advisors. 
This variable, for the purpose of statistical analysis, will be called inflate, and will be 
measured on a scale of 1-3 by the following criteria: 
1. Deflation (less than 2.0% inflation) 
2. Normal (between 2.0% and 4.0% inflation) 
3. Inflation (greater than 4.0% inflation) 
On the table below, yearly averages of inflation below 2.0 and above 4.0 are in bolded 
and shaded in grey to indicate years during which inflation was significantly above or below this 
range, or in one case, deflation occurred. 
 
 
Table 3 – Monthly Inflation Rates and Yearly Average Inflation Rates in the U.S. during Instances of Divided 
Government, Post-World War II 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Avg 
1947 18.13 18.78 19.67 19.02 18.38 17.65 12.12 11.39 12.75 10.58 8.45 8.84 14.65 
1948 10.23 9.30 6.85 8.68 9.13 9.55 9.91 8.89 6.52 6.09 4.76 2.99 7.74 
1955 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74 -0.37 -0.74 -0.74 -0.37 -0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 -0.28 
1956 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.75 1.12 1.87 2.24 1.87 1.86 2.23 2.23 2.99 1.52 
1957 2.99 3.36 3.73 3.72 3.70 3.31 3.28 3.66 3.28 2.91 3.27 2.90 3.34 
1958 3.62 3.25 3.60 3.58 3.21 2.85 2.47 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.11 1.76 2.73 
1959 1.40 1.05 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.69 0.69 1.04 1.38 1.73 1.38 1.73 1.01 
1960 1.03 1.73 1.73 1.72 1.72 1.37 1.37 1.02 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.46 
1969 4.40 4.68 5.25 5.52 5.51 5.48 5.44 5.71 5.70 5.67 5.93 6.20 5.46 
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Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Avg 
1970 6.18 6.15 5.82 6.06 6.04 6.01 5.98 5.41 5.66 5.63 5.60 5.57 5.84 
1971 5.29 5.00 4.71 4.16 4.40 4.64 4.36 4.62 4.08 3.81 3.28 3.27 4.30 
1972 3.27 3.51 3.50 3.49 3.23 2.71 2.95 2.94 3.19 3.42 3.67 3.41 3.27 
1973 3.65 3.87 4.59 5.06 5.53 6.00 5.73 7.38 7.36 7.80 8.25 8.71 6.16 
1974 9.39 10.02 10.39 10.09 10.71 10.86 11.51 10.86 11.95 12.06 12.20 12.34 11.03 
1975 11.80 11.23 10.25 10.21 9.47 9.39 9.72 8.60 7.91 7.44 7.38 6.94 9.20 
1976 6.72 6.29 6.07 6.05 6.20 5.97 5.35 5.71 5.49 5.46 4.88 4.86 5.75 
1981 11.83 11.41 10.49 10.00 9.78 9.55 10.76 10.80 10.95 10.14 9.59 8.92 10.35 
1982 8.39 7.62 6.78 6.51 6.68 7.06 6.44 5.85 5.04 5.14 4.59 3.83 6.16 
1983 3.71 3.49 3.60 3.90 3.55 2.58 2.46 2.56 2.86 2.85 3.27 3.79 3.22 
1984 4.19 4.60 4.80 4.56 4.23 4.22 4.20 4.29 4.27 4.26 4.05 3.95 4.30 
1985 3.53 3.52 3.70 3.69 3.77 3.76 3.55 3.35 3.14 3.23 3.51 3.80 3.55 
1986 3.89 3.11 2.26 1.59 1.49 1.77 1.58 1.57 1.75 1.47 1.28 1.10 1.91 
1987 1.46 2.10 3.03 3.78 3.86 3.65 3.93 4.28 4.36 4.53 4.53 4.43 3.66 
1988 4.05 3.94 3.93 3.90 3.89 3.96 4.13 4.02 4.17 4.25 4.25 4.42 4.08 
1989 4.67 4.83 4.98 5.12 5.36 5.17 4.98 4.71 4.34 4.49 4.66 4.65 4.83 
1990 5.20 5.26 5.23 4.71 4.36 4.67 4.82 5.62 6.16 6.29 6.27 6.11 5.39 
1991 5.65 5.31 4.90 4.89 4.95 4.70 4.45 3.80 3.39 2.92 2.99 3.06 4.25 
1992 2.60 2.82 3.19 3.18 3.02 3.09 3.16 3.15 2.99 3.20 3.05 2.90 3.03 
1995 2.80 2.86 2.85 3.05 3.19 3.04 2.76 2.62 2.54 2.81 2.61 2.54 2.81 
1996 2.73 2.65 2.84 2.90 2.89 2.75 2.95 2.88 3.00 2.99 3.26 3.32 2.93 
1997 3.04 3.03 2.76 2.50 2.23 2.30 2.23 2.23 2.15 2.08 1.83 1.70 2.34 
1998 1.57 1.44 1.37 1.44 1.69 1.68 1.68 1.62 1.49 1.49 1.55 1.61 1.55 
1999 1.67 1.61 1.73 2.28 2.09 1.96 2.14 2.26 2.63 2.56 2.62 2.68 2.19 
2000 2.74 3.22 3.76 3.07 3.19 3.73 3.66 3.41 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.39 3.38 
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Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Avg 
2007 2.08 2.42 2.78 2.57 2.69 2.69 2.36 1.97 2.76 3.54 4.31 4.08 2.85 




The national debt, which is a statistic maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
is the total amount of money owed by the federal government of the United States to holders of 
U.S. debt instruments.  This is the cumulative amount of debt held by states, corporations, 
individuals, and foreign governments, but does not include intragovernmental debt obligations. 
This variable, for the purpose of statistical analysis, will be called inflate, and will be 
measured on a scale of 1-3 by the following criteria: 
1. Marginal (less than 5.0% increase in debt) 
2. Normal (between 5.0% and 8.0% increase in debt) 
3. Significant (greater than 8.0% increase in debt) 
These statistics are available for each year under review since the beginning of World 
War II, is measured on the last day of each fiscal year (June 30 from 1842 until 1977, September 
30 since 1977) and is measured on the table below in the rate of millions (number x $1,000,000). 
 
Table 4 – U.S. National Debt at the end of each fiscal year during Instances of Divided Government, Post-World War II   
(x $1,000,000) 
Year National Debt Year National Debt 
1947 258,286 1983 1,377,210 
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Year National Debt Year National Debt 
1948 252,292 1984 1,572,266 
1955 274,374 1985 1,823,103 
1956 272,750 1986 2,125,302 
1957 270,527 1987 2,350,276 
1958 276,343 1988 2,602,337 
1959 284,705 1989 2,857,430 
1960 286,330 1990 3,233,313 
1969 353,720 1991 3,665,303 
1970 370,918 1992 4,064,620 
1971 398,129 1995 4,973,982 
1972 427,260 1996 5,224,810 
1973 458,141 1997 5,413,146 
1974 475,059 1998 5,526,193 
1975 533,189 1999 5,656,270 
1976 620,433 2000 5,674,178 
1981 997,855 2007 9,007,653 
1982 1,142,034 2008 10,024,724 
 
 To break this information down further and more specifically, data from years of divided 
government during which military engagements took place will be combined into one graph, 
showing the cumulative growth or reduction in the rate of unemployment during that year, the 
average rate of inflation over that year, and the percentage increase or decrease of the national 
debt for that year. 
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Table 5 – Review of Unemployment, Inflation and National Debt during Instances of Military Conflicts and Divided 




Avg. Rate of Inflation % Increase of National Debt 
1959 
Vietnam - 0.7 1.01 3.0 
1960 
Vietnam + 1.4 1.46 0.6 
1969 
Vietnam + 0.1 5.46 1.8 
1970 
Vietnam + 2.2 5.84 4.9 
1971 
Vietnam + 0.1 4.30 7.3 
1972 
Vietnam - 0.6 3.27 7.3 
1973 
Vietnam 0.0 6.16 7.2 
1974 
Vietnam + 2.1 11.03 3.7 
1975 
Vietnam + 0.1 9.20 12.2 
1976 
Vietnam - 0.1 5.75 16.4 
1989 
First Gulf War 0.0 4.83 9.8 
1990 
First Gulf War + 0.9 5.39 13.2 
1991 
First Gulf War + 0.9 4.25 13.4 
1992 
First Gulf War + 0.1 3.03 10.9 
1995 
NATO Yugoslavia 0.0 2.81 6.0 
1996 
NATO Yugoslavia - 0.2 2.93 5.0 
1999 
NATO Yugoslavia - 0.3 2.19 2.4 
2000 
NATO Yugoslavia - 0.1 3.38 0.3 
2007 
Iraq / Afghanistan + 0.3 2.85 5.9 
2008 
Iraq / Afghanistan + 2.3 3.85 11.3 
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Looking at the data in this format, it is evident that the budgetary health of the nation may 
have been a factor during many of these periods of time and possibly had an impact on policy.   
During the Vietnam War, unemployment was edging upward very consistently, with an 
exception to the period from 1972-73.  During this two year period, however, the rate was 
consistently higher than the generally agreed-upon normal frictional unemployment rate of 4.5%.  
Inflation was also consistently an issue, with each year except for 1972 being a year of higher-
than-acceptable inflation.  A consistent marked increase in the national debt during these years as 
well paints a complete picture of a period of economic downturn that likely was at least an 
undertone for the way in which policy was crafted during this era. 
 During the First Gulf War, spending also significantly increased, inflation was higher 
than acceptable, and unemployment was slowly rising month by month.  This period of 
economic tension was the beginning of what became a full recession in 1992 and likely cost 
George Herbert Walker Bush his second term as President. 
  During the years of engagement in Yugoslavia, the economy was relatively serene, with 
unemployment relatively steady in the range of 5.6% in 1995 and in the range of 4.1% 
throughout 1999, the lowest in many years.  Additionally, inflation was within the acceptable 
range both years, and while the national debt continued to increase, the percentages at which it 
was increasing were much lower than in previous years. 
 In 2007 and 2008, unemployment began a turn upward as part of the beginning of the 
economic recession that we are currently experiencing.  Inflation has stayed within acceptable 
levels, but mostly because of a reduction in consumer spending as a result of the recession.  The 
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national debt increased significantly as the government began attempts to provide debt relief for 
certain sectors of the economy.   
 
Relative Size of Majority 
 
 Data on the demographic of each Congress since the end of World War II is kept by the 
Office of the Clerk in the U.S. House of Representatives.  This data provides details of the 
number of members in each Congress from each party, as well as the way that third-party 
members caucused during that term. 
These variables, for the purpose of statistical analysis, will be called majhouse and 
majsenat.  The variable majhouse will be measured on a scale of 1-5 by the following criteria: 
1. Strong Democrat (Democratic majority of 75 seats or more) 
2. Weak Democrat (Democratic majority of between 25 and 74 seats) 
3. Tossup (Democratic majority of 24 seats or less to Republican majority of up to 
24 seats) 
4. Weak Republican (Republican majority of between 25 and 74 seats) 
5. Strong Republican (Republican majority of 75 seats or more) 
The variable majsenat will be measured on a scale of 1-5 by the following criteria: 
1. Strong Democrat (Democratic majority of 14 seats or more) 
2. Weak Democrat (Democratic majority of between 7 and 13 seats) 
3. Tossup (Democratic majority of 6 seats or less to Republican majority of up to 6 
seats) 
4. Weak Republican (Republican majority of between 7 and 13 seats) 
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5. Strong Republican (Republican majority of 14 seats or more) 
 
The table below lists the demographics of the House of Representatives during each 
Congress since World War II when the House of Representatives, the Senate, or both were led by 
a different party than the executive branch.  The years of that Congress are indicated, along with 
the number of members of the Democratic Party, the number of members of the Republican 
Party, any third-party members of the chamber, and the actual majority held by the party in 
power.  The number in bold in each Congress indicates the party that holds the majority.  The 
table to the right provides explanations of how the third-party members caucused during that 
particular Congress.      
Table 6 – Relative Majorities in House of Representatives, Instances of Divided Government, Post-World War II 
Congress
110
 Years Dem GOP 3rd Majority 
80
th
 1947-49 188 246 1* 57 
84
th
 1955-57 232 203  29 
85
th
 1957-59 234 201  33 
86
th
 1959-61 283 153 1* 131 
91
st
 1969-71 243 192  51 
92
nd
 1971-73 255 180  75 
93
rd
 1973-75 242 192 1* 51 
94
th
 1975-77 291 144  147 
97
th
 1981-83 242 192 1* 49 
98
th
 1983-85 269 166  103 
                                                 
110
 Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present).  110th Congress, 1st Session.  Office of the Clerk.  United  
States House of Representatives.  2 Apr 2007.  http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html.  




 – American-Labor – caucused with Democrats 
86
th








 – Independent – caucused with Republicans 
102
nd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
103
rd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
104
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
106
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats  
 76 
Key: Dem = Democratic Party, GOP = Republican Party, 3rd = Third Parties 
Congress
110
 Years Dem GOP 3rd Majority 
99
th
 1985-87 253 182  71 
100
th
 1987-89 258 177  81 
101
st
 1989-91 260 175  85 
102
nd
 1991-93 267 167 1* 101 
104
th
 1995-97 204 230 1* 24 
105
th
 1997-99 206 228 1* 21 
106
th
 1999-01 211 223 1* 11 
110
th
 2007-09 233 202  21 
 
 
The table below lists the demographics of the Senate during each Congress since World 
War II when the House of Representatives, the Senate, or both were led by a different party than 
the executive branch.  The years of that Congress are indicated, along with the number of 
members of the Democratic Party, the number of members of the Republican Party, any third-
party members of the chamber, and the actual majority held by the party in power.  The number 
in bold in each Congress indicates the party that holds the majority.  The table to the left 
provides explanations of how the third-party members caucused during that particular Congress. 
 
Table 7 – Relative Majorities in Senate, Instances of Divided Government, Post-World War II 
Congress
111
 Years Dem GOP 3rd Majority 
80
th
 1947-49 45 51  6 
84
th
 1955-57 48 47 1* 2 
                                                 
111
 Ibid.  




 – American-Labor – caucused with Democrats 
86
th








 – Independent – caucused with Republicans 
102
nd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
103
rd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
104
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
106
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats  




 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
92
nd
 – Conservative – caucused with Republicans 
92
nd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
93
rd
 – Conservative – caucused with Republicans 
93
rd
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
94
th
 – Conservative – caucused with Republicans 
94
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
97
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
110
th
 – Independent – caucused with Democrats 
110
th
 – Independent Democrat – caucused with 
Democrats  
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Key: Dem = Democratic Party, GOP = Republican Party, 3rd = Third Parties 
Congress
111
 Years Dem GOP 3rd Majority 
85
th
 1957-59 49 47  2 
86
th
 1959-61 65 35  30 
91
st
 1969-71 57 43  14 
92
nd
 1971-73 54 44 2* 10 
93
rd
 1973-75 56 42 2* 14 
94
th
 1975-77 60 38 2* 22 
97
th
 1981-83 46 53 1* 6 
98
th
 1983-85 46 54  8 
99
th
 1985-87 47 53  6 
100
th
 1987-89 55 45  10 
101
st
 1989-91 55 45  10 
102
nd
 1991-93 56 44  12 
104
th
 1995-97 48 52  4 
105
th
 1997-99 45 55  10 
106
th
 1999-01 45 55  10 
110
th
 2007-09 49 49 2* 2 
 
  
Analysis of this data shows very few instances during which the party holding a majority 
in the LB during periods of divided government was capable of overriding a presidential veto 
purely by the demographic of that chamber.  While an override of a veto has historically 
occurred through a bipartisan coalition in opposition to a President, such a circumstance is rare 
on an issue as contentious and often partisan as the prosecution of war. 
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 From the data above, it can be gleaned that there has only been one instance, the 94
th
 
Congress from 1975-77, when a party, in this case the Democrats, held a majority in the House 
of Representatives that could automatically override a veto.  In this case, the Democrats held a 
147-seat majority in a House with 435 members.
112
  In the 86
th
 Congress from 1959-61, the 
Democrats held a 131-seat majority in a House with 437 members, falling eight votes short of an 
automatic veto override.
113
  No other majority in the House of Representatives since World War 
II has been within 20 votes of having the ability to automatically override a veto.
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 In the Senate, similar circumstances have dominated the history of this chamber since 
World War II.  There have been no instances where a party held 67 seats, so no party has had the 
ability to override a veto purely based on its majority.  There have been two instances (the 86
th
 
Congress from 1959-61 and the 94
th
 Congress from 1975-77) during which a party could invoke 
cloture based on its majority.
115
  In the 86
th
 Congress, the Democrats had a 30-seat majority, and 
in the 94
th
 Congress, the Democrats held a 22-seat majority.
116
  While having the ability to 
invoke cloture and stop a filibuster is an important power to have to allow legislation to be read 
and brought to a vote, it does not guarantee the ability to override a presidential veto. 
 With no instances during which both chambers have had the ability to override a veto, 
and only one during which the House of Representatives was capable of doing so, it is difficult to 
analyze whether the size of the majority held in the LB impacts the choice of the party in power 
in Congress to pursue policy in contradiction to that of the EB.  The 94
th
 Congress in the House 












of Representatives, however, can be looked at singularly to determine whether any evidence of 
this relationship may exist. 
 The House of Representatives during the 94
th
 Congress, from 1975-77, consisted of 291 
Democrats and 144 Republicans.
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  While this Congress came into session during the 
prosecution of the Vietnam War, this military conflict ended on April 30, 1975, a mere four 
months after the beginning of this Congress.  
 
Analysis of Appropriations Requests 
 
This variable, for the purpose of statistical analysis, will be called approps, and will be 
measured on a scale of 1-4 by the following criteria: 
1. None (0 appropriations requests rejecting the funding request of the EB) 
2. Minimal (1-2 appropriations requests rejecting the funding request of the EB) 
3. Moderate (3-5 appropriations requests rejecting the funding request of the EB) 
4. Significant (6 or more appropriations requests rejecting the funding request of the 
EB) 
 
The Vietnam War 
 
An extended instance of divided government occurred during the prosecution of the 
Vietnam War, with Democrats controlling the House of Representatives by a majority no smaller 
than 51 during the period of 1969-1975 and the Senate by a majority no smaller than 10.  




Republicans controlled the White House during this period, with Richard Nixon serving from 
1969-1974 and Gerald Ford serving from 1974 through 1977. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, public opinion on the prosecution of the war in Vietnam 
progressively became more negative as the war went on, and this negative opinion was reflected 
in the Congress as well.  The LB‟s opposition to the war began with the Cooper-Church 
Amendment, the first of nine pieces of legislation seeking to restrict deployment of troops 
through the power of the purse during this conflict.  Listed first in the table below, this 
amendment sought to end funding to retain ground troops and military advisors in Cambodia and 
Laos, bar air operations in Cambodian airspace and direct support of Cambodian forces without 
congressional approval, and end American support for Republic of Vietnam forces outside of 
territorial South Vietnam.  This amendment passed as part of the Foreign Military Sales Act in 
the House and eventually became Public Law 91-652 after being included in the Special Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1971.
118
 
The table below details nine separate instances during this defined period of divided 
government during which the Democratic-controlled Congress passed legislation that either 
defined the terms for which funds could be used in theatre or defined a timeline for how long this 
war could be prosecuted.  In every case, with exception for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 
both the House and Senate passed this legislation by majorities capable of overturning a 




                                                 
118
 U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in  




Table 8 – Legislation Passed by Congress Limiting Presidential Policy during Vietnam War 
Year Congress Bill # Legislative 
Vehicle 
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The First Gulf War 
 
 The entire First Gulf War was fought under an instance of divided government, with 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, a Republican, in the White House and with significant 




 Congresses.  
Democrats maintained a majority no smaller than 85 members in the House during that period 
and had at least a 10 seat majority in the Senate during that period of time. 
This war was prosecuted in a relatively short time frame (mobilization of troops began on 
August 2, 1990 and combat ended on February 28, 1991) and the war ended decisively in favor 
of the Allied Forces.  Following Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, public opinion globally, as 
well as within the United States, supported efforts to liberate Kuwait, leading to the passage of 
United Nations Resolution 660, condemning the invasion of Kuwait and demanding a 
withdrawal or Iraqi troops.  This was followed by the passage of United Nations Resolution 661, 
authorizing economic sanctions against Iraq, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 
665, authorizing “the use of measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be 
necessary…to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their 
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661.”
120
 
With the sizeable majority noted above, Democrats could have posed a significant 
challenge to the wishes of the Bush Administration during the prosecution of this war.  In fact, 
the vote in Congress authorizing the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait on January 
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12, 1991, was the closest vote authorizing force by the Congress since the War of 1812, with the 
resolution passing by a vote of 250 to 183 in the House and 52 to 47 in the Senate.   
Funding for this war, however, came with relatively little controversy, partly because a 
significant majority of the cost of this war was offset by contributions from the 34 member 
nations who fought with the United States against Iraq, with the remaining costs absorbed as part 
of that year‟s budget for the Department of Defense.
121
  Thus, no additional appropriations bills 
or supplemental funding bills were votes on in Congress, and with this being the case, no specific 
examples can be cited of the Congress using the power of the purse to challenge the policies of 
the President or to enact its own policy with regard to prosecution of the war.     
 
NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia  
 
 With an instance of divided government occurring during both instances of American 
military intervention in Yugoslavia as part of NATO operations, this would naturally be a case 
for review in this study.  The unique aspect of this case as compared to the other three, however, 
is that during this military conflict, the EB was held by a Democrat (Bill Clinton) and the LB 
was controlled by the Republican Party. 
 While this military conflict was fought under the command of NATO, as with other 
NATO missions, a majority of the supplies and troops involved in combat were American.  
However, because this conflict was fought under the command of NATO with supplies and 
troops already committed to coalition activity paid for by previous appropriations bills prior to 
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the beginning of these conflicts, no specific appropriations requests were considered by the LB 
that impacted U.S. military involvement in Yugoslavia. 
 Therefore, there is no way to statistically compare the impact of the independent 
variables on the actions, or lack thereof, of the LB in this instance.   
 
Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
An instance of divided government occurred during the 110
th
 Congress, with the 
Democratic Party assuming control of both chambers of the LB during the last two years of the 
administration of President George W. Bush.  Following twelve years of leadership in the House 
of Representatives and maintaining a majority in the Senate for a significant portion of that same 
period, the Republican Party suffered great losses in the 2006 congressional elections largely as a 
result of the public‟s dissatisfaction with the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq.   
This victory and subsequent assumption of power by the Democrats in both chambers 
opened the door for a rhetorical war between the LB and EB on how Operation Enduring 
Freedom would be continued.  This rhetorical war became a battle over legislative strategy in 
2007 when the Congress sent H.R. 1591, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans‟ Care, Katrina 
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, to President George W. Bush‟s desk.   
In Section 1901 of this bill, the Congress provided “that none of the funds appropriated or 
made available…could be used to deploy any armed forces unit unless the chief of the military 
department concerned certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the 




  In addition, in Section 1902, the Congress declared that “no funds 
appropriated…would have been permitted to be obligated or expended to initiate developing, to 
continue developing, or to execute any order that would have the effect of extending the 
deployment of any Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard unit beyond 365 days or of 
any Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve unit beyond 210 days.”
123
  Authority to waive these 
clauses required a certification on a unit-by-unit basis in writing to the appropriate committees 
that such deployments were required for reasons of national security. 
However the most controversial part of this bill was Section 1904, which “would have 
required the President by July 1, 2007, to make and report to Congress determinations relating to 
progress that the government of Iraq is making in meeting the benchmarks” that were provided 
for in the bill.
124
  The inability of the President to do that would have resulted “in the 
commencement of troop redeployment from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of 
completing redeployment within 180 days.”
125
 
President Bush vetoed this bill on May 1, 2007, calling it “unconstitutional because it 
purports to direct the conduct of operations of war in a way that infringes upon the powers vested 
in the presidency by the Constitution, including as commander and chief of the Armed 
Forces.”
126
  The House of Representatives attempted to overturn the veto, but failed by a vote of 
222 to 203, well short of the two-thirds majority required to do so, thus killing the bill. 
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The next attempt at a war supplemental bill was H.R. 2206, the U.S. Troop Readiness, 
Veterans‟ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act Appropriations Act, which was 
agreed to by both chambers on May 24, 2007 and signed into law by President Bush the 
following day.  The major difference between this bill and the prior bill was the elimination of 
the timetable for withdrawing troops, which was the major sticking point between the 
Democratic majority in Congress and President Bush throughout the debate over the continuing 
war in Iraq.  In the end, the Congress gave in to President Bush‟s request for additional funding 
required to fund the campaign through September 30, 2007.
127
   
The battle over funding operations in Iraq continued as the Congress debated funding for 
the FY2008 budget.  H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, provided for $70 
billion in supplemental appropriations for military activities in Iraq.  No redeployment language 
was included in this bill, but the bill did “mandate that the Secretary of Defense should report to 
Congress on progress towards stability in Iraq within 60 days after enactment and every 90 days 
thereafter.”
128
  President Bush signed this bill into law on December 26, 2007. 
These two bills are the only actual examples, in terms of appropriations bills, of 
legislative attempts by the Democratic Congress to assert its authority to dictate the terms of 
engagement in the war in Iraq.  From these two examples, it seems apparent that while the 
Democratic Congress attempted to assert its authority over the continuation of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, both through its power of the purse and through the mandate it declared as a result of 
the 2006 election, it failed in its efforts and ultimately removed clauses which provided it with 
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authority over the decisions made by the President to ensure operations and troops in Iraq 
remained fully funded during a critical portion of the war.  






When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
majhouse, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is .315, indicating a fairly strong positive relationship.  If the 
null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we will 
obtain this statistic by chance approximately 32% of the time. 
   
Table 9 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and majhouse 
 
  number of 
appropriations 
requests 
relative majority in 
House 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .315 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .375 
N 10 10 
relative majority in House Pearson Correlation .315 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .375  
N 10 10 
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Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of 1.079 and a regression coefficient of .289.  This tells 
us that the larger the majority in the House of Representatives, the likelihood of more 
appropriations requests increases by .289.  In relation to the null hypothesis, the P-value of .375 
indicates the observed results occur relatively frequently by chance, thus requiring a rejection of 
the null.  In summary, this shows there is no significant relationship between the relative 
majority in the House of Representatives and the number of appropriations requests. 
 
Table 10 – Linear Regression: approps and majhouse 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .100 -.013 .849 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.079 .616  1.752 .118 
relative majority in House .289 .308 .315 .940 .375 









When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
majsenat, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is -.125, indicating a relatively weak negative relationship.  If 
the null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we 
will obtain this statistic by chance approximately 13% of the time. 
Table 11 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and majsenat 
 





number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.125 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .731 
N 10 10 
relative majority in Senate Pearson Correlation -.125 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .731  
N 10 10 
 
Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of 1.800 and a regression coefficient of -.100.  This tells 
us that the larger the majority in the Senate, the likelihood of more appropriations requests 
decreases drastically.  However, with a P-value of .731, it can be said that the majority in the 
Senate is not significantly related to the number of appropriations requests.  In summary, this 
shows there is no significant relationship between the relative majority in the Senate and the 
number of appropriations requests. 
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Table 12 – Linear Regression: approps and majsenat 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .016 -.107 .887 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.800 .627  2.869 .021 
relative majority in Senate -.100 .281 -.125 -.356 .731 




When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
unemploy, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is -.134, indicating a relatively weak negative relationship.  If 
the null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we 





Table 13 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and unemploy 
 
  number of 
appropriations 
requests unemployment rate 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.134 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .713 
N 10 10 
unemployment rate Pearson Correlation -.134 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .713  
N 10 10 
 
Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of 2.000 and a regression coefficient of -.143.  This tells 
us that the higher the rate of unemployment, the likelihood of more appropriations requests 
decreases drastically.  However, with a P-value of .713, it can be said that the rate of 
unemployment is not significantly related to the number of appropriations requests.  In summary, 
this shows there is no significant relationship between the rate of unemployment and the number 






Table 14 – Linear Regression: approps and unemploy 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .018 -.105 .886 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.000 1.086  1.842 .103 
unemployment rate -.143 .375 -.134 -.381 .713 





When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, inflate, 
to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, Pearson‟s 
correlation coefficient is .234, indicating a relatively weak positive relationship.  If the null is 
correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we will obtain 
this statistic by chance approximately 23% of the time. 
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Table 15 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and inflate 
 
  number of 
appropriations 
requests inflation rate 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .234 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .515 
N 10 10 
inflation rate Pearson Correlation .234 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .515  
N 10 10 
 
Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of .927 and a regression coefficient of .293.  This tells 
us that the larger the majority in the House of Representatives, the likelihood of more 
appropriations requests increases by .293.  In relation to the null hypothesis, the P-value of .515 
indicates the House majority is not significantly related to the number of appropriations requests.  
In summary, this shows there is no significant relationship between the rate of inflation and the 
number of appropriations requests. 
 
Table 16 – Linear Regression: approps and inflate 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .055 -.063 .870 













t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .927 1.025  .904 .392 
inflation rate .293 .429 .234 .682 .515 




When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
natldebt, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is .060, indicating there is virtually no relationship.  If the null 
is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we will 
obtain this statistic by chance approximately 6% of the time. 
 
Table 17 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and natldebt 
 
  number of 
appropriations 
requests 
rate of increase 
of national debt 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .060 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .869 
N 10 10 
rate of increase of national 
debt 
Pearson Correlation .060 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .869  
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  number of 
appropriations 
requests 
rate of increase 
of national debt 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .060 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .869 
N 10 10 
rate of increase of national 
debt 
Pearson Correlation .060 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .869  
N 10 10 
 
Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of 1.478 and a regression coefficient of .058.  This tells 
us that the higher the rate of increase of the national debt, the likelihood of more appropriations 
requests decreases drastically.  However, with a P-value of .869, it can be said that the rate of 
increase in the national debt is not significantly related to the number of appropriations requests.  
In summary, this shows there is no significant relationship between the national debt and the 
number of appropriations requests. 
 
 
Table 18 – Linear Regression: approps and natldebt 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .004 -.121 .893 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.478 .768  1.926 .090 
rate of increase of national 
debt 
.058 .340 .060 .171 .869 





When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
pubopprz, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is .639, indicating there is a relatively significant positive 
relationship.  If the null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two 













Table 19 – Bivariate Correlation: approps and pubopprz 
 





number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .639
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .047 
N 10 10 
public opinion of president Pearson Correlation .639
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .047  
N 10 10 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of .784 and a regression coefficient of .327.  This tells 
us that the higher the popularity of the President, the likelihood of more appropriations requests 
increases by .327.  In relation to the null hypothesis, the P-value of .047 indicates the observed 
results occur frequently by chance, thus requiring a rejection of the null.  In summary, this shows 




Table 20 – Linear Regression: approps and pubopprz 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .408 .334 .688 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .784 .410  1.911 .092 
public opinion of president .327 .139 .639 2.349 .047 





When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
pubopcon, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is .704, indicating there is a relatively significant positive 
relationship.  If the null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two 

















Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of -.600 and a regression coefficient of .400.  This tells 
us that the lower the popularity of the President, the likelihood of more appropriations requests 
increases.  However, with a P-value of .704, it can be said that the popularity of the Congress is 
not significantly related to the number of appropriations requests.  In summary, this shows there 
is no significant relationship between public opinion of Congress and the number of 
appropriations requests. 
 
Table 22 – Linear Regression: approps and pubopcon 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .040 -.200 .894 
a. Predictors: (Constant), public opinion of congress 
 
 
  number of 
appropriations 
requests 
public opinion of 
congress 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .200 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .704 
N 10 6 
public opinion of congress Pearson Correlation .200 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .704  










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.600 4.750  -.126 .906 
public opinion of congress .400 .980 .200 .408 .704 





When comparing the dependent variable, approps, with the independent variable, 
pubopwar, to gauge the direction and strength of the relationship between the two variables, 
Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is .406, indicating there is a fairly strong positive relationship.  .  
If the null is correct in its assertion that no relationship exists between the two variables, then we 
will obtain this statistic by chance approximately 41% of the time. 
 







Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .165 .026 .875 










Analyzing this relationship further through linear regression, the coefficients table 
produced shows a Y-intercept (constant) of .648 and a regression coefficient of .259.  This tells 
us that the higher the popularity of the war, the likelihood of more appropriations requests 
increases.  In relation to the null hypothesis, the P-value of .318 indicates the observed results 
occur relatively frequently by chance, thus requiring a rejection of the null.  In summary, this 
shows there is no significant relationship between public opinion of war and the number of 
appropriations requests. 
 





  number of 
appropriations 
requests 
public opinion of 
current conflict 
number of appropriations 
requests 
Pearson Correlation 1 .406 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .318 
N 10 8 
public opinion of current 
conflict 
Pearson Correlation .406 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .318  
N 8 8 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .165 .026 .875 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .648 1.058  .612 .563 
public opinion of current 
conflict 
.259 .238 .406 1.089 .318 
a. Dependent Variable: number of appropriations requests    
 
 
To effectively analyze the data collected, below is a compilation table of statistics 
collected from analysis of all of the independent variables. 
 
Table 25 – Compilation of Data on Independent Variables Collected from Statistical Analysis 
Independent Variable Pearson’s R Constant B Standard Error Significance 
majhouse .315 1.079 .289 .308 .375 
majsenat -.125 1.800 -.100 .281 .731 
unemploy -.134 2.000 -.143 .375 .713 
inflate .234 .927 .293 .429 .515 
natldebt .060 1.478 .058 .340 .869 
pubopprz .639 .784 .327 .139 .047 
pubopcon .200 -.600 .400 .980 .704 
pubopwar .406 .648 .259 .238 .318 
 
From this data, significance levels show for all independent variables, with exception of 
pubopprz, there is no relation between any of these variables and the dependent variable, 
approps.  What this proves, however, is that there is a statistically significant relationship 




CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Upon reviewing and analyzing all of the data, it appears that public opinion does play a 
significant part in whether the LB attempts to use the power of the purse to affect the policies of 
the President and the prosecution of military action, confirming Paul Burstein‟s assessment.  
With confirmation that the public opinion of the President has a statistically significant 
relationship to the number of appropriations requests by the LB in rejection of the EB‟s policies, 
it is apparent that this LB does attempt to reject the policies of the EB when the public disagrees 
with the EB‟s policies.  The influence of the size of the relative majorities in both chambers of 
the LB does not appear to significantly play a part in whether the LB acts to rebut the foreign 
policy of the EB, nor do economic factors (unemployment, inflation, national debt).   
    
Summary of Findings 
  
One trend that became evident from this data is that the LB appears to act in response to 
public opinion when the prevailing opinion is overwhelmingly against military action and when 
the prevailing opinion is overwhelmingly against the EB.  The two post-World War II instances 
of divided government during which the LB was most active in rejecting the EB‟s foreign policy 
were the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom, both of which became immensely 
unpopular wars and were led by presidents whose popularity declined as those wars dragged on.  
In both of those instances, the LB sought to either defund the war or set timelines for its end.  
During the other military engagements, which based on polling appear to have been more 
popular or, in the case of NATO involvement in Yugoslavia were brief engagements that may 
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not have induced well-thought opinions, the LB did not express opposition in the form of 
legislation. 
Analysis of the impact of the size of the majorities of the two branches of the LB gleaned 
no relevant or significant data.  While the size of the majority in a chamber can dictate the 
success of the agenda of the majority party, in the case of these instances of military conflict, it 
does not appear the actual agenda itself was determined by the size of the majority, but rather by 
the public opinion of the military engagement itself, as well as that of the president. 
Additionally, there does not seem to be a significant relationship between the economic 
factors analyzed (unemployment, inflation, national debt) and how the LB reacts to the EB‟s 
foreign policy.  Beyond the confirmation of this from the analysis of the data, the instance of 
divided government currently on-going in the 112
th
 Congress can be cited as another example 
refuting the impact of these factors.  With the highest sustained level of unemployment in nearly 
80 years and the highest national debt in the history of the United States, the Republican majority 
in the House has made reducing the deficit its top priority and is looking to cut funding in nearly 
every sector of the government, but is not seeking to reduce funding for Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan or for the remaining troops in Iraq.   
 
Analysis of Research Question 
 
The research questions were “what political factors play into the role the LB plays in the 
crafting of foreign policy during…instances [of divided government]?  Do variables, including 
public opinion, budgetary constraints, or the relative size of the majority in the LB, impact the 
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role this branch plays?  Or is this often subservient role dictated purely by precedent and 
tradition?” 
Based on the analysis of the data, the answer to both of these questions is “no.”  Rather, 
the answer appears to be that the LB, which is directly elected by the people, as opposed to the 
EB, who is elected by the Electoral College, responds to the opinions of the public and creates 
policy in rejection of the EB when the public has rejected the EB‟s policy.  Based on the data, it 
does not seem that public opinion directly impacts the actions of the EB, as in the two most 
relevant examples of how this public opinion may play a part; President Nixon continued to 
prosecute an unpopular Vietnam War and President George W. Bush continued to prosecute an 
unpopular Operation Iraqi Freedom.  While the indirect election through the Electoral College 
may not protect the EB, the difference in how the two branches are elected does not seem to 
deter the EB from making policy decisions related to military conflict. 
In comparing this conclusion to the hypothesis presented, the hypothesis was correct in 
predicting the LB would attempt to assert its authority to impact the prosecution of the EB‟s 
foreign policy and be unsuccessful in these attempts, but did not accurately predict the instances 




The data suggests that there is a clear relationship between the public opinion of the 
military engagement and of the president, and the actions of the LB.  This should create a level 
of expectation for the EB that under such circumstances, the EB is more likely to encounter 
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rejection of their foreign policy by the LB.  This may also influence the EB to evolve its policy 
relevant to individual military engagements based on public opinion if, for no other reason, to 
ensure negative opinion of that engagement does not cost significant political losses for the EB‟s 
party, as occurred at the end of the 109
th
 Congress. 
Additionally, it should signal to the LB that when public opinion is against the military 
engagement and the president, the LB can be more confident in its decision to propose legislation 
in rejection of the military engagement.  Whether such action would achieve success in terms of 
ending that military engagement seems unlikely, but as the most recent example analyzed in the 
109
th
 Congress may indicate, such action may serve to achieve success in terms of political 
victory in the next election. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
While the variables analyzed were relevant to the research question and provide insight 
into the conclusion, there may be better, more in-depth ways to analyze these variables.  The 
dependent variable, approps, could be either reviewed more in depth to determine the 
relationship between the actual amounts in each bill and the size of the majorities in both 
chambers of the LB to further determine the impact of the majority on the LB‟s behavior.   
In terms of the independent variables, analysis of majhouse and majsenat could be 
enhanced to include an in-depth evaluation and analysis of how conservative or liberal the 
majority party is in each branch of the LB.  By reviewing vote history and placing the parties on 
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a spectrum, there could be an opportunity to further investigate whether the polarization of the 
political parties determines the impact the majority party‟s behavior relative to the EB. 
Finally, while the three independent variables relative to budgetary constraints on the LB 
(unemploy, inflate and natldebt) are all critical variables that are impacted by the state of the 
economy, there may be other economic indicators that could be analyzed, including the 
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